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Perpetual Affordability Covenants: Can 
These Land Use Tools Solve the Affordable 




Approximately 3.8 million privately-owned residential housing units 
in America today contain affordability covenants recorded in their chains 
of title. State and local agencies and the District of Columbia use these 
covenants to ensure that publicly-subsidized properties are actually used 
to provide affordable housing. With rents at all-time highs and stagnant 
wages, the affordable housing crisis has reached a fever pitch. House 
Democrats are proposing billions more in housing subsidy. To the extent 
those funds subsidize privately-owned housing development they, too, 
will be secured by affordability covenants. In response to this crisis, a new 
trend in high cost markets is to extend the duration of affordability 
covenants into perpetuity to create or maintain a permanent stock of 
privately-owned affordable housing, rather than allowing these covenants 
to expire after some term of years. Despite their ubiquity, there is no 
scholarship and remarkably little case law on the validity of affordability 
covenants. This is astonishing given that affordability covenants often do 
not satisfy the traditional requirements for real covenants or equitable 
servitudes at common law, and yet are relied upon to secure billions of 
dollars of public investment in affordable housing.  The scarce case law 
on affordability covenants relies on public land use justifications to uphold 
these covenants, ignoring traditional property law doctrine. This Article 
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argues that affordability covenants belong among the new, “hybrid,” 
public/private land use devices that straddle traditional property law and 
public land use law. The Article looks to other hybrid devices that have 
received more judicial scrutiny and scholarly interest—particularly 
conservation easements—and concludes that affordability covenants are 
at risk of judicial invalidation unless they are supported by state enabling 
legislation. Finally, the Article argues that the unique public purpose 
driving perpetual affordability covenants gives rise to legislative 
considerations that should be addressed by all state enabling acts.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION: Affordability Covenants – Ubiquitous, 
Unexamined and Unenforceable?  
Imagine you are the director of the Department of Housing for a 
major American city. A group of low-income senior citizens, most of 
whom are Chinese-American, come to you for help. Their privately-
owned apartment building of more than 300 federally-subsidized units 
(one of only two remaining in your city’s historic but gentrified Chinatown 
neighborhood) is for sale. The seller’s asking price is approximately $200 
million more than the subsidized rents can support. The seller justifies the 
price by saying it is the value of the land after demolition of the existing 
building, assuming the land will be used for luxury housing and retail. 
Thirty-five years ago, in exchange for public financing, the developer of 
the property recorded a real covenant that runs with the land restricting the 
property for use as affordable housing for forty years. Even though there 
are five years left on the covenant, there are commercial real estate 
developers making bids for the building at or near the seller’s asking price, 
confirming the market appetite to replace the building with the luxury 
apartments and retail now ubiquitous in Chinatown. You must either 
prepare for this property to leave your affordable housing portfolio when 
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the covenant expires, recognizing that these elderly residents will almost 
certainly be displaced not only from their building but from all of 
Chinatown, or you must jump into the fray to compete for this property at 
its unrestricted market rate in order to preserve it as affordable housing.1 
To avoid having to make a decision like this with future affordable housing 
projects, you consider an intriguing idea being used in Boston—the 
perpetual affordability covenant.2 When developers record covenants that 
run with the land in exchange for public financing in the future, instead of 
allowing those covenants to expire after 15, or 40, or even 60 years, why 
not make the covenant perpetual?  
When public resources are invested into developing privately-owned, 
affordable housing the public agency supplying the resource typically 
requires the owner of the housing to promise, or covenant, that the housing 
will only be used to house low- or moderate-income people.3 To ensure 
that this promise is kept by whomever owns the land, even if the original 
owner sells the property, the covenant is recorded into the land records 
with the intent that the restriction “runs with the land.” Typically, the 
covenant states that the public agency who supplied the public resource is 
the beneficiary of the covenant and has the right to enforce the covenant 
in law or in equity.4 Federal affordable housing financing program 
regulations, like the HOME Investment Partnerships program (“HOME”)5 
and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (“LIHTC”),6 set some 
 
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on the story of Museum Square in Washington, 
D.C. See Aaron Wiener, Bull in Chinatown: Developer Tells Section 8 Tenants to Pay Up 
or Get Out, WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (July 9, 2014), http://bit.ly/2HZwKpa. 
2. I would like to gratefully acknowledge that the inspiration for this article came 
from my participation in a round-table meeting about the viability of perpetual affordability 
covenants cohosted in November 2016 by the Urban Institute, Enterprise Community 
Partners, D.C. Coalition for Smarter Growth, and the D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute and from 
my work as an appointee on D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser’s Affordable Housing 
Preservation Strikeforce in 2016.  
3. See, e.g., Preservation, NCSHA, https://www.ncsha.org/advocacy-
issues/preservation/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2019); Mechanisms for Preserving Affordability, 
INCLUSIONARY HOUS., http://bit.ly/2YP0ksK (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).  
4. As an example, New Jersey has a mandatory statutory form for affordability 
covenants. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:80-26.1 (2019).  
5. The HOME program provides a formula grant match from the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to states and localities primarily for the 
purpose of expanding the supply of decent, safe, and affordable housing available to low 
and very low-income households. To be awarded funds from HUD, participating 
jurisdictions must implement multi-year strategies for acquiring, rehabilitating, or 
constructing affordable rental housing via public-private partnerships. See HOME 
Investment Partnerships Program Rule, 24 C.F.R. § 92.1 (2019). 
6. The LIHTC program encourages private equity investment in the construction and 
rehabilitation of rental housing reserved for households at or below 60% of the Area 
Median Income. An affordable housing project owner participating in the LIHTC program 
receives a 10-year tax credit that can be passed through to an investor in exchange for an 
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of the original affordability covenant durations. For example, affordability 
covenants required in exchange for HOME funds range from 5 to 20 
years.7 The minimum affordability period required by the LIHTC program 
is now 30 years.8 At the end of the restriction period, the covenant 
automatically expires and the owner of the property is free to rent or sell 
the housing unit at market rate. 
By a very rough estimate, there are approximately 3.8 million 
affordability covenants restricting privately-owned housing units in the 
United States today.9 Affordability covenants have been regularly and 
commonly used in privately-owned, publicly-funded affordable housing 
development transactions since the 1980s, if not earlier.10 All states, 
territories, and the District of Columbia require affordability covenants to 
be recorded in the chain of title for housing subsidized with federal, state, 
and local funds, including funds from the federal HOME and LIHTC 
programs.11 Affordability covenants are used to restrict all types of 
housing tenure, from single-family, condominium, and cooperative home 
 
equity investment made prior to the project being placed in service. See I.R.C. § 42 (West 
2018). 
7. See 24 C.F.R. § 92.252. 
8. See I.R.C. § 42. 
9. It is extremely difficult to even approximate the number of affordability covenants, 
as each covenant is recorded in the local land records for a particular property. Tallying the 
number of housing units subsidized by federal programs mandating running covenants or 
deed restrictions does not yield a reliable figure because many affordable housing projects 
layer many sources of federal, state, and local financing. However, for raw data, we know 
that 2,313,856 units were placed in service between 1995 and 2015 as a part of the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit program. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (last updated 
May 24, 2019). Additionally, there are approximately 1.5 million units restricted as part of 
HUD’s Project Based Rental Assistance, Moderate Rehabilitation, Sections 236, 202, and 
811 programs. See Assisted Housing: National and Local, HUD, 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2019). 
According to the April 30, 2018 HOME Activities reports filed by all states, territories, and 
the District of Columbia, there are currently 116,300 total units subsidized with federal 
HOME funds. See Post 2011 HOME Activities, HUD EXCHANGE, http://bit.ly/2Wc79mE 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2019). This data does not include state and local programs that require 
restrictive covenants. 
10. An extensive list of HUD low-income rental housing programs including, 
Sections 202 and 811 housing, mixed-finance public housing, project-based Section 8, and 
221(d)(3) mortgage insurance programs, require long-term affordability covenants running 
with the land. See Mixed-Finance Amendment to Consolidated Annual Contributions 
Contract (Exhibit E(V)(A)), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (Nov. 26, 1996), 
bit.ly/2MsYgRn. Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects require a mandatory minimum 
30-year affordability covenant. The first 15 years is called the “compliance period” and the 
second 15 years or more is called the “extended use period.” See I.R.C. § 42(h)(6). States 
have the discretion to extend the extended use period beyond 15 years. Id. The HOME 
program also requires running covenants recorded in a state’s land records to secure 
affordability. See 24 C.F.R. § 92.252(e)(1)(ii). 
11. See Post 2011 HOME Activities, supra note 9.  
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ownership units to large, multi-family, corporate-owned rental properties. 
Many jurisdictions require affordability covenants in exchange for state 
and local sources of public financing;12 when public lands are sold, leased, 
or granted for residential use;13 or in exchange for zoning or permitting 
requests.14  
A recent trend in high cost markets15 is to extend the duration of 
affordability covenants in perpetuity to create a lasting stock of affordable 
housing insulated from gentrification and skyrocketing market rate 
property values. Boston currently requires perpetual affordability 
covenants for all privately-owned, publicly-funded affordable housing 
projects.16 Many other small and large municipalities are considering 
implementing perpetual affordability controls, or already use them in 
some, but not all, of their affordable housing programs. For example, the 
District of Columbia requires perpetual affordability secured by recorded 
covenants for all dispositions of public land to be used for housing.17 For 
units created as a part of the District of Columbia’s Inclusionary Zoning 
program and New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing program, 
covenants restrict the units for the life of the building.18 In September 
2017, New York City’s Housing Preservation and Development agency 
announced the roll-out of a policy to enable perpetual affordability in 
housing created on publicly disposed land.19 In Maine and Oregon, the 
 
12. According to the Center for Community Change’s Housing Trust Fund Projects, 
forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have state housing trust fund programs, 
most of which require affordability covenants to secure investments. Survey Report, Ctr. 
for Cmty. Change, State Hous. Tr. Funds 2018, http://bit.ly/2Xw8KQQ (last visited June 
3, 2019). E.g. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f) (West 2016) (establishing the California Low 
and Moderate Income Housing Fund and requiring affordability covenants for all funded 
projects).  
13. E.g. D.C. CODE ANN. § 10-801(b-3)(1)(C) (West 2019). 
14. E.g. N.Y.C., N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 23–90 (2018); Los Angeles property 
owners requesting a broad variety of discretionary zoning adjustments are required by 
ordinance to consent affordability covenants. Land Use Covenants, HOUS. CMTY. INV. 
DEP’T, https://hcidla.lacity.org/land-use-covenants (last visited Aug. 27, 2019) 
15. One measure of high cost housing markets is the National Low-Income Housing 
Coalition’s annual report, “Out of Reach,” which documents the gap between wages and 
rents in markets throughout the country. Out of Reach, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. 
(2019), https://reports.nlihc.org/oor. 
16. City of Boston, Neighborhood Development Housing Policies, Section 7-3, 
requires that all agency-assisted rental and cooperative housing be affordable in perpetuity 
via an Affordability Covenant. See BOSTON, MA., REDEVELOPMENT AUTH. § 7-3 (2019), 
https://bit.ly/2zdTJca. 
17. See D.C. CODE § 10-801(b-3)(1)(C). 
18. D.C. CODE § 6-1041.05(a)(2) (2007); N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 23911 
(2018). 
19. See Maria Torres-Springer, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Hous. Pres. and Dev., Address at the 
Citizens Budget Commission Breakfast (Sept. 20, 2017), https://on.nyc.gov/30rEfgI.  
ART 2 - PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2019  4:09 PM 
2019] PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS  63 
statutory default is that affordable housing covenants are of unlimited 
duration.20 
Federal, state, and local housing subsidy programs overwhelmingly 
seem to require the use of affordability covenants based on the assumption 
that these devices are appropriate and effective in binding the covenanter 
and its successors at common law. Only six jurisdictions have passed 
affordability covenant enabling acts to ensure the judicial enforceability 
of affordability covenants despite their inconsistencies with common law 
requirements.21 Notwithstanding their ubiquitous use, there is no 
scholarship and remarkably little case law on the validity of affordability 
covenants.22 This is surprising given the billions of dollars of public 
investment these covenants are presumed to secure and the fact that 
affordability covenants often do not satisfy the traditional common law 
requirements for running real covenants or equitable servitudes.  In 
contrast, environmental servitudes, including conservation servitudes and 
environmental remediation covenants—both close cousins of affordability 
covenants—have received considerably more scholarly analysis.23 A 
 
20. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 122(3)(A) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 456.280 (West 2008). 
21. The six states with affordability covenant enabling statutes are California, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 62101(f) (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 126 (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 184, § 31 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.295 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 27, § 610 (West 1995); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:80-26.1 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
39.1-3 (1991). 
22. See generally Martin v. Villa Roma, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 632 (1982); Oceanside 
v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420 (1989); Columbus Park Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. 
& Dev., 598 N.E.2d 702 (N.Y. 1992); Montgomery Cty. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 721 
A.2d 249 (Md. 1998); Cannavaro v. Washington Cmty. Hous., No. CV030091521S, 2005 
WL 1433790 (Conn. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2005) (finding a use restriction, not an affordability 
covenant, related to an affordable housing development valid, court relies on Restatement 
of the Law (Third): Property (Servitudes) in combining real covenants, easements and 
equitable servitudes under the single label “servitudes” and in finding that servitudes can 
be validly created for the benefit of third parties appurtenant or in gross); Tivoli Stock 
L.L.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., No. 108052/06, 2006 WL 3751468 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2006); Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 
108 (2009); Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 266 P.3d 92 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); Huntington 
Beach v. Lee, No. 30-2009-00329477, 2015 WL 10635010 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2015); 
Boston Redevelopment Auth. v. Pham, 42 N.E.3d 645 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015); Society Hill 
at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n., Inc. v. Twp. of Piscataway, 138 A.3d 596 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 2016); Payne v. Payne, No. 15 MISC 000125, 2016 WL 1230098 (Mass. Land 
Ct. Mar. 30, 2016); 135 Wells Ave., L.L.C. v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 84 N.E.3d 1257 
(Mass. 2017); In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. P’ship, 859 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(finding that in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the value of a Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit project equals the value of the project subject to its affordability restrictions, 
not the unrestricted, market-rate value of the property). 
23. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common 
Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 3  (1989); Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and 
the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
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comparison of this scholarly literature is cause for concern about the 
judicial enforceability of most affordability covenants not supported by 
state enabling legislation.  
Although their legal footing at common law may be tenuous, the few 
extant cases pertaining to affordability covenants have tended to enforce 
the covenants, often based on uncomfortably vague public policy 
rationales or contract grounds.24 However, if the trend toward affordability 
covenants of perpetual duration continues to gain momentum, inevitably, 
courts and the housing finance market will begin taking a harder look at 
these covenants.25  
 
373, 380–84) (2001) (noting the many shortcoming of conservation easements as 
easements, real covenants or equitable servitudes at common law and the need for state 
enabling statutes); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy 
Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 
436–40 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Privately Held Conservation Servitudes]; Jessica Owley, 
Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation 
Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 137 (2011) (describing conservation easements as 
“a hybrid entity of property law, contract law, and private zoning”);  
Kurt A. Strasser, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act: Why, How, and Whether, 34 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 533, 536–37 (2007) (“The Uniform Environmental Covenant 
Act creates a state-law property interest that attaches use restrictions and monitoring and 
other requirements to the land . . . There are questions about the creation of this kind of 
servitude and its long term viability in the face of common law that is hostile to permanent 
land use restrictions, as well as questions about how such a covenant can be modified, and 
about achieving a level of legal enforceability . . . .”). 
24. For cases relying on public policy justifications, see infra Section II.B.2. 
Columbus Park Corp., 598 N.E.2d at 707,  (enforcing affordability covenants in multi-
family rental property enforced based on contract law); Montgomery Cty., 721 A.2d at 255 
(finding amounts owed to county for sale of restricted property in excess of affordability 
covenant resale formula found to be a personal liability of the seller, not a lien against the 
property without analysis of validity of covenant); Nordbye, 266 P.3d at 100 (upholding 
former tenant’s right to enforce an affordability covenant despite the covenant being 
released by the remote grantor and the original grantee); Lee, 2015 WL 10635010, at *5 
(finding an affordability covenant unenforceable where City failed to properly record the 
covenant in the land records and the defendant acquired the property without constructive 
or actual notice of the covenant); Pham, 42 N.E.3d at 646 (finding the defendant did not 
violate the provisions of the covenant without analyzing the underlying validity of the 
covenant during a suit to enforce proscription on unauthorized renting contained in 
affordability covenant); Society Hill at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n., Inc., 138 A.3d at 602 
(finding that the New Jersey Uniform Housing Affordability Controls regulations did not 
authorize the township to unilaterally extend the duration of an affordability covenant 
where the covenant itself did not grant the township such authority); Payne, 2016 WL 
1230098, at *3 (enforcing owner-occupancy and resale requirements without an analysis 
of the underlying validity of the covenant); 135 Wells Ave., L.L.C., 84 N.E.3d at 1265 
(finding that a use restriction contained in property deed for the benefit of the city is a 
property interested owned by the city and that the local board of zoning appeals did not 
have the authority to demand that the city alter or release this interest and, further, that no 
change in conditions of the neighborhood had occurred that would warrant termination of 
the affordability covenant). 
25. This same observation about the likelihood of intensifying scrutiny as restrictions 
age and burdened properties are conveyed to subsequent owners was made with regard to 
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This Article lays some necessary ground work in anticipation of that 
harder look at the enforceability of affordability covenants. The Article 
first walks through the ways that affordability covenants both conform and 
fail to conform to the requirements of common-law private land use 
restrictions (namely running covenants and equitable servitudes). Next, 
the Article considers how affordability covenants both resemble and fail 
to resemble public land use restrictions (namely zoning). Finding that 
affordability covenants are neither purely public nor purely private land 
use devices, the Article concludes that affordability covenants belong 
among the constellation of “hybrid” public/private land use devices 
created in the latter half of the twentieth century. As with other “hybrid” 
land use devices (namely conservation servitudes, environmental 
covenants, contingent zoning, and development agreements)—enabling 
legislation is necessary to overcome discrepancies with common-law 
requirements and to ensure the enforceability of affordability covenants.  
Next the Article turns to an examination of the public land use 
rationale undergirding affordability covenant enabling legislation. A 
review of the six existing state enabling acts reveals that, while these 
enabling acts are certainly better than nothing, they generally fail to clearly 
articulate elements of substantive and procedural due process that are the 
hallmark of valid public land use regulation. Better affordability covenant 
enabling legislation is possible. The Article first looks to zoning law to 
sketch the parameters of state contracting and police powers vis á vis 
development exactions jurisprudence.  
Finally, the Article weighs two alternative fundamental policy goals 
for perpetual affordability covenant enabling legislation: one based in 
suppressing the value of real estate and the other based in capturing the 
value of the property interest created by the covenant, and the divergent 
drafting concerns each approach suggests. 
II.  NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE, BUT A HYBRID OF THE TWO 
Perpetual affordability covenants are unquestionably land use 
restrictions—they are intended to restrict specific parcels of land for use 
exclusively as “affordable housing” (in the myriad ways that term can be 
defined).26 However, they do not fall neatly into any of the categories of 
land use restriction cognizable in traditional property law. Most first year 
property students are taught that land use restrictions are bifurcated into 
private land use restrictions between discrete private parties, and public 
 
Conservation Easements in 2008. C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of 
Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25 (2008). 
26. There is a legitimate, on-going debate about what “affordable housing” means. 
For simplicity, I will use the term inclusively to refer to any housing that is sold or rented 
below its market rate to buyers or renters whose incomes do not exceed designated limits. 
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land use restrictions created by public legislative or executive bodies and 
applied to regions through legislation and regulation.27 In this section, the 
Article explains that perpetual affordability covenants resemble private 
land use restrictions (namely servitudes) in many ways, but not necessarily 
enough to be enforceable as servitudes according to traditional common 
law. The Article will then discuss the Restatement of Law Third 
(Property): Servitudes (“Restatement”)’s treatment of affordability 
covenants, including its attempt to validate affordability covenants as well 
as its unclear influence on the law. Additionally, this Article will argue 
that while in form perpetual affordability covenants do not resemble 
zoning, in function they do. Thus, this part of the Article will draw the 
conclusion that perpetual affordability covenants are a hybrid of public 
and private land use regulation, potentially lacking validity as servitudes 
at traditional common law. After considering how the blending of state 
contract and police powers in public/private land use agreements can be 
“basically legitimate or fundamentally flawed,”28 this part will finally 
consider scholarship, case law, and legislation in relation to the 
enforceability of another “hybrid” public/private land use device—
conservation servitudes. 
A.  Risk of Invalidity as Common Law Real Covenants or 
Equitable Servitudes 
1.  Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes Refresher 
Before analyzing affordability covenants’ validity as either real 
covenants or equitable servitudes, it may be necessary to provide a refresh 
of this arcane area of property law. Real covenants and equitable 
servitudes are non-possessory, private-land-use controls recognized at 
common law, whereby one piece of land is burdened for the benefit of 
another piece of land.29 They are enforceable promises made between 
private landowners that are intended to “run with the land,” burdening or 
benefiting the land regardless of whether the original parties sell their 
 
27. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 521 (Jesse 
H. Chopper et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000); JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 777 (Vicki Been 
et al. eds., 8th ed. 2013); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH  665, 783 (Jesse H. Chopper et al. eds., 3d ed. 2015); ALICIA 
B. KELLY & NANCY J. KNAUER, PROPERTY LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 553 
(2017).  
28. Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, 
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use 
Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 965 (1987). 
29. CHARLES E. CLARK, “REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH 
LAND” 1–6 (2d ed. 1947). 
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lands to subsequent buyers.30 As promises between private parties, 
whether the original covenant is enforceable is determined by contract 
law.31 However, whether the benefits and burdens created by the original 
parties are binding on subsequent owners of the subject parcels is the 
subject of property law.32  
The traditional test for determining whether a covenant “runs with 
the land” requires: (1) the covenant be made by express grant in 
conformity with the Statute of Frauds; (2) horizontal and vertical privity; 
(3) the original parties intended that both the benefit and the burden of the 
covenant should “run” to subsequent owners; (4) the covenant “touch and 
concern” the land; and (5) subsequent parties have notice of the 
covenant.33 Traditionally, an aggrieved party is entitled to a remedy at law 
in the event of violation of a real covenant.34  
Equitable servitudes are similar to real covenants in that they are 
private restrictions on the use of land. However, they are enforceable in 
equity and the test for their existence is more lenient than the test for real 
covenants. Equitable servitudes require: (1) express grant in a writing that 
satisfies the Statute of Frauds; (2) intent of the original parties that the 
benefit of the servitude should “run”; (3) the covenant “touch and concern” 
the land; and (4) notice of the servitude.35   
Traditionally, running covenants and equitable servitudes were 
disfavored as antithetical to the free and unfettered use of land.36 The party 
seeking to enforce the covenant had the burden of proving that the 
covenant satisfied common law requirements.37   
2.  Affordability Covenants Often Do Not Satisfy the 
Requirements for Real Covenants 
In this section, the Article examines whether affordability covenants 
satisfy each of the common law requirements for real covenants and 
equitable servitudes. Most affordability covenants will satisfy the 
following requirements: the Statute of Frauds; the parties’ intent that the 
covenant run; vertical privity; and notice. However, this Article will argue 
 
30. William Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 
861, 864 (1977). 
31. Id. at 867. 
32. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 892–93. 
33. Stoebuck, supra note 30, at 867. 
34. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 27, 717–18. See also STOEBUCK & 
WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 473–90. 
35. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 492, 495–99. 
36. See CLARK, supra note 29, at 72; Susan French, Toward a Modern Law of 
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1281–82 (1982).  
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note, at 346 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
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that affordability covenants often will not satisfy the requirements of 
horizontal privity nor that the benefit of the covenant touch and concern 
the land. Moreover, this section explains how affordability covenants may 
be at risk of being invalidated as unreasonable restraints on alienation. 
a. Affordability Covenants Typically Comply with the 
Statute of Frauds, Intent to Run, Vertical Privity, and 
Notice Requirements 
Affordability covenants are usually created by express grant from the 
burdened land owner to a benefiting public body with language stating 
“this covenant is intended to bind successors in interest and run with the 
land” or the like.38 This writing usually satisfies the Statute of Frauds and 
provides evidence of the parties’ intent that the covenant should run with 
the land.39 Affordability covenants are typically recorded as their own, 
free-standing documents in the chain of title of the burdened property, but 
may also be included as covenants in a deed, ground lease, or even 
(unwisely) mentioned in a deed or ground lease but fully articulated in an 
unrecorded document.40 This recording usually supplies subsequent 
purchasers with valid constructive notice. Finally, because affordability 
covenants apply to residential real estate, which is typically conveyed in 
its entirety in fee simple, there is rarely concern with the vertical privity 
requirement for real covenants and equitable servitudes.41  
b.  Affordability Covenants Often Lack Horizontal 
Privity 
It is less clear that affordability covenants meet the requirements for 
horizontal privity traditionally required for a real covenant to run at 
common law. The majority rule in American courts is that horizontal 
privity exists when part or all of an estate is conveyed from one party to 
another, as in the conveyance of a leasehold, easement, or fee estate.42 In 
 
38. See generally HOME Investment Partnerships Program Rule, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 92.252(e)(1) (2013).  
39. E.g., New Jersey’s mandatory covenant form at N. J. ADMIN. CODE §5:80-26.1 
(2017).  
40. See generally Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, 127 
Cal. App. 4th 248 (2005) (finding that a Deed of Trust secured both affordability 
restrictions and  Note and, therefore, prepayment of the Note did not entitle the property 
owner to release of the Deed of Trust until expiration of the affordability restriction); 
Huntington Beach v. Lee, No. 30-2009-00329477, 2015 WL 10635010, at *5 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 17, 2015) (finding the covenant unenforceable because the defendant bought a 
condominium unit without actual or constructive notice when the legal description attached 
to the covenant failed to properly identify the subject unit).  
41.  See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 482. 
42. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 895; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra 
note 27, at 485.  
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the twentieth century, American courts broadened their view of privity to 
allow homeowners’ associations to enforce covenants as agents of 
neighboring landowners.43 This development is significant because 
homeowners’ associations sometimes own no interest in land at all,44 
which means that there is nothing upon which a covenant benefit can 
attach. Therefore, property-less homeowners’ associations lack both 
horizontal and vertical privity.  
Applying the horizontal privity requirement to affordability 
covenants, there is a clear case for horizontal privity when there is a 
conveyance of real estate from a municipality to the affordable housing 
developer. For example, a city sale, grant, or ground lease of land that it 
owns to an affordable housing developer through its public disposition 
regulations should constitute horizontal privity.45 However, where a 
municipality merely lends or grants money to an affordable housing 
project without having conveyed the real estate for the project, it is less 
certain that a court will find that the horizontal privity requirement has 
been met.46   
Of course, this problem with horizontal privity can be resolved 
(though perhaps not easily) by conveying the real estate to the public body 
and then back to the intended owner, once again. Alternatively, there may 
be an argument that the owner’s granting of a deed of trust to the public 
body to secure repayment of loan funds or performance of affordability 
covenant obligations creates a contemporaneous property interest 
sufficient to create horizontal privity.47 For example, in Dieckmeyer v. 
 
43. See Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n., Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 
N.E.2d 793, 798 (N.Y. 1938). 
44. E.g., in Neponsit, a developer constructed a neighborhood and conveyed each 
parcel to homebuyers with a covenant requiring each homeowner to pay a neighborhood 
association fee. The developer assigned the benefit of the covenant to a neighborhood 
association, created by the developer, which owned no real estate whatsoever. When the 
neighborhood association attempted to enforce the covenant to pay dues against the 
defendant, the defendant challenged the validity of the covenant because the plaintiff 
neighborhood association was not in horizontal privity with the developer. Id. at 797–98. 
45. In Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, the Housing Authority 
sold the property to the Riekses’ predecessors in interest and included the affordability 
covenant in the deed at the time of conveyance. 78 Va. Cir. 108, 108 (2009). In Oceanside 
v. McKenna, the City’s Community Development Commission sold the property to the 
affordable housing developer and recorded the affordability covenant at the time of 
conveyance. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1423 (1989).  
46. See Montgomery Cty. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 721 A.2d 249, 257, 259 (Md. 
1998) (finding that the affordability covenant instrument affecting a single-family home 
did not specifically create a lien against the property, nor was it a right or estate in land 
and, therefore, the county’s right to surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale was that of a 
general creditor, subordinate to other, prior recorded, judgement creditors and the purchase 
money mortgage).  
47. In one New York case, a servitude was enforced where the covenantee was a 
purchase money mortgagee. Without directly addressing the issue, the court apparently 
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Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, the California Appellate 
Court declined to release the deed of trust held by the municipality when 
the homeowner prepaid her Note to the municipality in full, because the 
court concluded that the deed of trust also secured the homeowner’s 
promise to abide by the affordability restrictions contained in the 
conditions, covenants, and restrictions of the subdivision and in the 
homeowner’s deed.48  
c.  The Benefit of Affordability Covenants Often Does 
Not Touch or Concern Land 
It is also unclear whether the benefit of an affordability covenant can 
be said to “touch and concern” the land. Traditionally, for the burden of a 
covenant or servitude to run with the burdened estate, both the burden and 
the benefit of the covenant must “touch and concern” parcels of real 
estate.49 This necessitates the existence of a “benefiting estate.”50  
When the benefit of a covenant or servitude does not touch and 
concern a benefiting estate, but instead benefits an individual or private 
party, the benefit is said to be “in gross.”51 Regardless of whether the 
burden of a covenant runs to a subsequent owner when the benefit is held 
in gross, a handful of courts have held that the covenant as between the 
original grantor and grantee is invalid based on the public policy favoring 
free alienability of land where there is no benefiting estate at the time the 
covenant is created.52  
The benefiting party in an affordability covenant is typically a local 
body of government or a local housing agency that holds the benefit in 
 
assumed that a mortgage was a sufficient property interest to entitle the benefiting party to 
enforcement of the covenant. See Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power 
Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. 1973). 
48. In Dieckmeyer, the court did not address horizontal privity because it was not in 
dispute – the homeowner entered into the affordability covenant upon conveyance of the 
property from the private developer of the condominium complex. Dieckmeyer v. 
Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, 127 Cal. App. 4th 248, 258 (2005). 
49. As stated by Thomas E. Roberts: 
On the burden side, the generally accepted test is that in order for a transferee of 
the original promisor to be bound, both the benefit and burden must touch and 
concern, or be appurtenant to, land. In other words, not only must the promisor 
have land that is affected by the promise, but so too must the promise must also 
[sic] have land affected. If the benefit of the promise does not concern or relate 
to land, then the benefit is regarded as personal, or in gross, and the successor to 
the promisor will not be bound. 
Thomas E. Roberts, Promises Respecting Land Use – Can Benefits be Held In Gross?, 51 
MO. L. REV. 933, 937 (1986).   
50. Id.  
51. Id. at 934. See also, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 440.  
52. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 938. 
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gross—not for the benefit of another estate in land.53 The majority 
common law rule would find these covenants, whose benefits are held in 
gross by a government agency, unenforceable against subsequent holders 
of the burdened estate.54 For example, in Wilmurt v. McGrane, the New 
York Court of Appeals found that a covenant made by a landowner to the 
state Department of Health could not run because the Department of 
Health owned no land to which the benefit of the covenant could attach.55   
Nonetheless, in enforcing affordability covenants, most courts have 
not found the touch and concern requirement an insurmountable obstacle, 
even if their rationales are not always clear. For example, in Nordbye v. 
BRCP/GM Ellington, an affordable housing developer recorded an 
affordability covenant for the benefit of the Oregon Housing and 
Community Services Department (“OHCS”) and income-qualifying 
former, current, and future tenants of the property.56 In preparing for a 
foreclosure sale of the property, OHCS and the subsequent owner of the 
property entered into and recorded a release of the property’s “Extended 
Use Agreement” (an affordability covenant).57  Ms. Nordbye, a resident of 
the property, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the 
affordability covenant despite the recorded release agreement.58 The 
foreclosure buyer argued that the affordability covenant was invalid and 
never ran with the land because there was no vertical privity and the 
benefit of the covenant did not touch and concern an estate of OHCS.59 
Rather than addressing these challenges to the requirement for a running 
real covenant directly the court dismissed them out of hand with an 
unsatisfying contract law rationale, relying on the fact that the original 
parties deemed the requirements for a running covenant satisfied in the 
original instrument.60  
 
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
54. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 960 (arguing that a benefit in the public interest 
should be a valid substitute for a dominant estate).  
55. See Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 416 (N.Y. 1897); but see Bill Wolf 
Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. 1973) 
(finding that a mortgagee was entitled to enforce covenant in equity).  
56. See Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 213–15 (2011). 
57. See id. at 216–17. 
58. See id. at 217. 
59. Id. at 225. 
60. The court suggested that the original parties created a running real covenant 
binding on subsequent purchasers based solely in contract law. Indeed, the court continued 
with a circumlocutory, “we are not aware of any authority supporting the proposition that 
such an agreement [“deemed satisfactory” language] is legally ineffective.” Id. The 
rationale misses the opportunity to point out that all of the requirements for a running 
covenant, including privity and the requirement that the covenant touch and concern an 
estate of the grantee, are satisfied as between the grantor and Ms. Nordbye as a tenant 
beneficiary under the covenant.  
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There is one instance of a court specifically finding that an 
affordability covenant does touch and concern the land.61 In Fairfax 
County Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Riekse, the Virginia 
Circuit Court looked only to whether the burden of the covenant touched 
and concerned the burdened land and relied heavily on public policy and 
contract justifications for the affordability covenant.62 In several other 
cases, the courts simply ignored the requirement that the benefit of a 
covenant run with the land.63 
d.  Affordability Covenants are Almost Always 
Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation 
Beyond the problem of failing to meet the horizontal privity and 
touch and concern prongs of the real covenants and equitable servitudes 
tests, affordability covenants run the risk of being found invalid as 
unreasonable restraints on alienation. Until the twentieth century, running 
covenants and servitudes were disfavored restraints on alienation that 
prevented real property from being put to its highest and best use.64 In 
traditional property law, restraints on alienation are divided into direct and 
indirect restraints.65 A direct restraint is “a provision which, by its terms, 
prohibits or penalizes the exercise of the power of alienation.”66 At 
common law, direct restraints on alienation are generally void.67 Direct 
 
61. Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 114 (2009) 
(stating, “[a]ccordingly, sale of a property to carry out the Housing Authority’s goal of 
providing “safe, decent, and sanitary housing for those citizens with low or moderate 
incomes” touches and concerns this property”) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 36–3 (2018)). 
62. In addition, the Virginia Circuit Court stated that: 
The Housing Authority sold this property to the Tovars pursuing the goals of the 
Act and the Tovars purchased the property with the condition that furthered the 
purpose of the Act. If I were to adopt a narrow interpretation of “touch and 
concern the land” by holding that an unfettered sale of the property did not “touch 
and concern” the land I would frustrate actions taken by the Plaintiff and agreed 
to by the Grantees in pursuit of the legislative goals set out for it in Virginia Code 
§ 36–2. 
Id. at 113. 
63. In McKenna, the court treated an affordability restriction contained in a 
neighborhood’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restriction (“CC&Rs”) as enforceable like 
any other CC&Rs, despite the fact that the parties authorized to enforce the CC&Rs are the 
City and the housing commission. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1423 (1989). 
64. See Stoebuck, supra note 30, at 885–86; Charles E. Clark, Limiting Land 
Restrictions, 27 A.B.A. J. 737, 739 (1941).  
65. See LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 237 (2d ed. 
1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DON. TRANS. I II INTRO. NOTE (1983); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
66. SIMES, supra note 65, at 237. 
67. See id. at 237–52 (cataloguing the three kinds of direct restraints on alienation, 
disabling restraints, forfeiture restraints, and promissory restraints, and explaining the 
limited circumstances when forfeiture and promissory restraints might be enforceable at 
common law); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 232–33. 
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restraints include prohibitions on transfers without consent of a third party, 
prohibitions on transfers to particular persons, requirements for transfers 
to particular persons, options to purchase land, and rights of first refusal.68   
Affordability covenants typically include one or more of the direct 
restraints listed above.69 For example, the affordability covenants involved 
in several of the cases discussed above, as well as the New Jersey statutory 
affordability covenant form, all prohibit transfers of subject properties 
without prior agency approval and allow transfers only to eligible low-
income buyers.70 As discussed above, the affordability covenants in Riekse 
and Montgomery County v. May Department Stores Co. granted the county 
housing agencies options to repurchase the subject properties, another type 
of direct restraint.71  
Throughout the twentieth century, some jurisdictions have turned 
away from invalidating all direct restraints on alienation in favor of the 
view that restraints on alienation may be valid if they are reasonable.72 
Reasonableness is determined by balancing the justification for the 
restriction against the quantum of restraint.73 One of the three factors 
typically considered in the balancing test is the duration of the 
restriction—the longer the covenant, the greater the quantum of restraint, 
the more likely the covenant will be found unreasonable and thus 
unenforceable.74 To the extent that common law calls into question the 
enforceability of affordability covenants as direct restraints on alienation, 
 
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 comment b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
69. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:50-26 (2018); see also Payne v. Payne, No. 15 MISC 
000125, 2016 WL 1230098, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 30, 2016).  
70. See Society Hill at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n., Inc. v. Twp. of Piscataway, 138 
A.3d 596, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2016); Payne, 2016 WL 1230098, at *2; 
Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, 127 Cal. App. 4th 248, 250–
52 (2005) ; Huntington Beach v. Lee, No. 30-2009-00329477, 2015 WL 10635010, at *1 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:50-26 (2018). 
71. Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 108 
(2009); Montgomery Cty. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 721 A.2d 249, 252 (Md. 1998). 
72. See In re Tamen, 22 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1994); Mardis v. Brantley, 717 So.2d 
702, 709 (2d Cir. 1998); Tovrea v. Umphress, 556 P.2d 814, 818–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); 
Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. 
L. REV. 373, 374 (1935) (exploring, and supporting, broader judicial acceptance of racially 
restrictive covenants at the time, stating, “the courts will necessarily be influenced by the 
extent to which elimination of social friction and maintenance of property values may be 
secured by upholding such restraints”). 
73. See Alfaro v. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Sys. & Plan. Ass’n, 141 Cal. App. 4th 
1356, 1376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
74. Metro. Dade Cty. v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So.2d 551, 552–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (considering duration of covenant, 30 years, with automatic 10-year extensions, 
unless a majority of neighboring property owners consent to release, to be unreasonable 
restraint on alienation); Clark, supra note 64, at 739; Manning, supra note 72, at 381–91. 
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perpetual affordability covenants are even more suspect; increasing the 
risk that the covenant will be deemed unreasonable.75  
Despite the common law’s position on direct restraints on alienation, 
three California cases have directly addressed whether affordability 
covenants are unreasonable restraints on alienation, and all three have 
found that they are reasonable and enforceable.76 In Martin v. Villa Roma, 
Oceanside v. McKenna, and Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement 
Systems & Planning Ass’n, the California Court of Appeals applied the 
balancing test and found that the covenants supported a strong public 
interest in creating affordable housing.  
Of particular note, the Alfaro plaintiffs challenged the affordability 
covenant as unreasonable because of the fact that it was perpetual in 
duration.77 The court dodged the issue without directly addressing the 
validity of perpetual covenants by finding that the covenant created was 
not of perpetual duration but was limited by the covenant language to the 
duration “while the ‘development . . . remains in existence in or upon any 
part of, and thereby confers benefit upon, the subject property described 
herein.’”78  
3.  Affordability Covenants Often Do Not Meet the 
Requirements of Valid Equitable Servitudes 
It is similarly uncertain whether affordability covenants pass 
common law muster as equitable servitudes. As mentioned above, the test 
for the validity of equitable servitudes also requires that the servitude 
touch and concern the benefiting parcel.79 Direct restraints on alienation 
are similarly likely to invalidate an equitable servitude. Since modern 
American courts have merged law and equity, and the requirements for 
equitable servitudes are slightly more liberal than those for real covenants, 
equitable servitudes have nearly replaced real covenants in American 
courts.80 The majority of equitable servitudes today are upheld as 
 
75. “In determining the injurious consequences likely to flow from enforcement of a 
restraint on alienation, the nature, extent and duration of the restraint are important 
considerations.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
76. See Martin v. Villa Roma, 131 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635 (1982); see also Oceanside 
v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420,1427–28 (1989); see also Alfaro, 141 Cal. App. 4th 
at 1376–77.  
77. See Alfaro, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1378. 
78. Id. at 1379. 
79. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 495 (“To run, equitable restrictions 
must touch and concern benefited and burdened land, and the requirement should be 
exactly the same as for real covenants.”); Roberts, supra note 49, at 934 (“[M]ost courts in 
this country deny enforceability to covenants and servitudes in gross.”). 
80. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 493. 
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neighborhood restrictions in common interest communities.81 These so-
called “reciprocal servitudes” exist when all houses in a neighborhood are 
bound by the same covenants, conditions, and restrictions declared by the 
developer of the neighborhood for the benefit of each neighboring house.82 
Often affordability covenants apply to fewer than all of the properties in a 
common interest community and thus are not reciprocal servitudes.  For 
example, in Riekse, the Virginia Circuit Court found that the affordability 
restriction failed as an equitable servitude because it was not part of a 
common neighborhood plan imposed by a common grantor.83 The 
Virginia rule, which limits equitable servitudes to only those restrictions 
applied to an entire subdivision by a common developer or grantor, is 
unusual. In the majority of jurisdictions, the difference between real 
covenants and equitable servitudes has been functionally erased.84  
4.  Affordability Covenants Fare Much Better Under the 
Restatement 
While affordability covenants may not meet the traditional 
requirements for real covenants and equitable servitudes at common law, 
they are by no means the only modern land use restrictions to encounter 
this problem. The Restatement was published in 2000 as an ambitious 
effort to not only unify the law of servitudes, but also to modernize the law 
to better accommodate modern land use restrictions like common interest 
community covenants, affordability covenants, and conservation 
easements.85 The effect of this Restatement, however, continues to unfold. 
Private land use restrictions are a notoriously confusing area of 
traditional property law.86 The Restatement attempts to modernize and 
streamline this disjointed, contradictory, and overlapping body of law87 by 
stripping away many of the formalistic eccentricities of real covenants and 
 
81. See id. at 504–14. 
82. See id. at 505. 
83. See Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 113 
(2009) (“By definition, an equitable servitude can only arise when a common grantor 
imposes a common restriction upon land developed for sale in lots.”). However, in most 
jurisdictions, real covenants and equitable servitudes are functionally merged, so that 
remedies at law or in equity may be permitted no matter the technical name of the 
restriction. See, e.g., Oceanside v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1426 (1989) (“Here, 
the CC&Rs are covenants running with the land. The Legislature has recognized that 
‘covenants and restrictions in the [document creating a condominium project] shall be 
enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable . . . .’”). 
84. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 493. 
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
86. Professor Susan French describes the law of easements, real covenants, and 
equitable servitudes as “. . . the most complex and archaic body of American property law 
remaining in the twentieth century,” and includes a bevy of scholarly lamentation. French, 
supra note 36, at 1261 n.1. 
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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equitable servitudes under the single term “covenant that runs with land.”88 
As a guiding principal, the Restatement attempts to jettison archaic 
technical rules that no longer serve a compelling purpose and replace them 
with unified rules based on freedom of contract, notice, and conformity 
with public policy.89 These rules reflect the reality that throughout the 
twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of covenants and servitudes 
have been created as restrictions to govern private residential development 
or “common-interest communities,”90 and have been overwhelmingly 
enforced as devices to enhance value and marketability of private 
residential property.91 The Restatement contains several ambitious and 
controversial articulations of the law of servitudes,92 but the three that most 
pertain to the enforceability of perpetual affordability covenants are the 
Restatement’s treatment of the touch and concern doctrine,93 direct 
restraints on alienation,94 and the shifting of the burden of proof in 
establishing the validity of a servitude.95 
a. The Restatement’s Supersession of the Touch and 
Concern Doctrine Aids the Enforceability of 
Affordability Covenants  
Arguably, the articulation in the Restatement that has garnered the 
most criticism by scholars is the section that declares the supersession of 
the touch and concern doctrine.96 Section 3.2 of the Restatement states,  
Neither the burden nor the benefit of a covenant is required to touch or 
concern land in order for the covenant to be valid as a servitude. Whether 
 
88. Id. § 1.4.  
89. See Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of 
Property Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1231 (1988). 
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2000). . It 
has been noted “that the subject of running covenants has become virtually synonymous 
with covenants in subdivisions and condominiums.” Id. The Restatement has been praised 
for “squarely situat[ing] the modern problems with servitudes in the context of the common 
interest community.” Id. 
91. See French, supra note 89, at 1217–18. 
92. This Article will not explore the Restatement’s extensive treatment of law related 
specifically to Common-Interest Communities and will only briefly consider the 
Restatement’s attempt to discontinue the terms “real covenants” and “equitable servitudes” 
under the unified term “covenant that runs with land.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 1.4. (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
93. See id. § 3.2.  
94. See id. § 3.4. 
95. See id. § 3.1. 
96. See Note, Touch and Concern, The Restatement Third of Property: Servitudes, 
and A Proposal, 122 HARV. L. REV. 938, 938 (2009); A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern 
is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REV. 804, 805 (1998); Stewart Sterk, Freedom 
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 
615, 661 (1984). 
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a servitude is valid is determined under the general rule stated in §3.1 
and the particular rules stated in §§ 3.4 through 3.7.97  
There is confusion in the scholarship over whether the Restatement 
eliminates the doctrine of touch and concern,98 or retains the doctrine but 
eschews the label. Restatement Reporter Professor French suggested that 
the Restatement’s intention is not to eliminate the doctrine, but only to 
discontinue use of what has become a confusing term of art.99  
Agreeing that the Restatement has this effect, Stoebuck and Whitman 
trace the continuation of the doctrine through the various sections of the 
Restatement.100 They explain that Section 5.2 of the Restatement permits 
“appurtenant” benefits and burdens to run,101 and § 1.5 defines 
“appurtenant” as meaning “that the rights or obligations of a servitude are 
tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land.”102 
The comment to § 1.5 explains, “[o]nly appurtenant benefits and burdens 
run with land . . . .”103 However, the Restatement deviates significantly 
from the common law implications of the touch and concern doctrine by 
declaring that an appurtenant burden (for example, a perpetual 
affordability covenant affecting a specific parcel of real estate) can run 
even if the benefit of the covenant is held in gross (for example, when the 
beneficiary of an affordability covenant is a municipality).104  
b. Affordability Covenants are Not Necessarily 
Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation 
In keeping with the Restatement’s goal to uphold servitudes under 
the rationale of freedom of contract subject to limitations based on 
illegality, unconstitutionality, or violations of public policy,105 the 
Restatement allows direct restraints on alienation so long as the restraint 
is reasonable.106 In determining whether a direct restraint is reasonable, the 
Restatement adopts the balancing tests articulated in Oceanside v. 
 
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
98. Tarlock, the editor of the Harvard Law Review, and Dukeminier fall into the camp 
of viewing the Restatement as eliminating the doctrine altogether. Tarlock, supra note 96, 
at 805; Note, supra note 96, at 938; DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 27, at 918.  
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES 3–4 Intro. Note (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
100. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 480. 
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 5.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
102. Id. § 1.5. 
103. Id. § 1.5 cmt. a.  
104. See id. § 2.6 cmt. d (“[B]enefits of affirmative and negative covenants . . . can 
be held in gross. Benefits in gross are useful in a variety of transactions in which burdens 
running with the land are desired, are permitted whether the servitude is a covenant, and 
easement or a profit.”). 
105. See id. § 3.1 cmt. a (2000). 
106. See id. § 3.4. 
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McKenna and similar cases.107 In weighing the utility of the restraint, the 
Restatement mentions servitudes used to preserve affordable housing,108 
but goes on to state, “[i]n determining the injurious consequences likely to 
flow from enforcement of restraint on alienation, the nature, extent, and 
duration of the restraint are important considerations.”109 In perhaps the 
most extensive acknowledgement of affordability covenants in any 
generalized treatment of servitudes, the Restatement actually contains a 
comment specifically addressing affordability covenants: 
Programs designed to provide affordable housing depend on severe 
restrictions on alienation to prevent resales at market prices. Such 
restraints include limitations on the price for which units can be sold, as 
well as limitations on permissible transferees. They may also include 
requirements that the owner sell when the owner ceases to be a member 
the group for whom the housing is provided. Such restraints are 
reasonable so long as designed to serve a legitimate purpose and so long 
as they permit a reasonable opportunity for the owner to transfer the 
unit.110 
Such direct recognition of affordability covenants offers welcomed 
clarity in determining whether these direct restraints on alienation should 
nonetheless be deemed enforceable. By referring to “units” and 
obligations to sell when “the owner ceases to be a member of the group 
for whom the housing is provided,” it is clear that the comment 
contemplates affordability covenants in the single-family homeownership 
context only, not affordability covenants as applied to owners of multi-
family rental properties. In the context of perpetual affordability covenants 
affecting large, multi-family rental properties, the Restatement’s 
reasonableness test for affordability restraints seems anemic. For example, 
the “reasonable opportunity for the owner to transfer” language in the 
Restatement seems to be referring to the certification process typically 
implemented to qualify potential buyers of affordable ownership 
housing.111 In contrast, one can imagine various scenarios that regularly 
arise in the affordable, multi-family, rental housing industry that are 
beyond the Restatement’s guidance, such as the impact of a covenant on a 
project owner’s ability to refinance, recapitalize a project, or re-organize 
an owner-entity.  
However, to the extent that the Restatement intends to shift 
enforceability determinations regarding servitudes away from archaic 
 
107. See id. 
108. See id. § 3.4 cmt c. 
109. Id.  
110. Id. § 3.4 cmt. h. 
111. Id.; see, e.g., Land Use Covenants, supra note 14.  
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black letter law and toward judicial oversight based on reasonableness,112 
the comment regarding affordable housing as reasonable restraints on 
alienation may be successful.  
c. The Restatement Shifts the Burden of Proof for 
Servitude Validity 
While much ink has been spilt about the Restatement declaration that 
the touch and concern doctrine is superseded, the greatest seismic shift in 
the Restatement is definitely in switching the presumption of validity of 
servitudes.113 Traditionally, common law has disfavored servitudes as 
antithetical to fundamental precepts of fee simple ownership.114 In 
contrast, the Restatement presumes that servitudes are valid according to 
modern principles of freedom of contract unless proven otherwise.115 
Perhaps the lack of controversy about section § 3.1 of the Restatement is 
proof that the Restatement has, indeed, documented well-established 
changes in the law of servitudes that have occurred over the course of the 
twentieth century with the advent of common interest communities.116 As 
with upholding the validity of covenants in common interest communities 
and conservation servitudes, the Restatement’s shifting of the burden to 
presume the validity of an affordability covenant greatly strengthens the 
validity and enforceability of perpetual affordability covenants. 
d. The Restatement and Judicial Treatment Find 
Affordability Covenants Valid Where Tradition 
Common Law Suggests They are Not 
Taken as a whole, the Restatement categorically improves the 
enforceability of affordability covenants, including perpetual affordability 
covenants, as compared to traditional common law. Not only does the 
 
112. The Restatement declares this intention to shift the law of servitudes away from 
archaic black letter law while “preserving the judiciary’s traditional role in protecting the 
public interest in maintaining the social utility of land resources.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: SERVITUDES 3 Intro. Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000); Tarlock, supra note 96, at 821–
22 (“The primary goal of the Restatement (Servitudes) is to articulate a non-constitutional 
standard of judicial review to address [lifestyle restrictions and restrictions that fail the 
reasonableness test].”).  
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. A (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
114. See id.; GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, 
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 8.02 (1990).  
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
116. As the Restatement explains, “the view that the wide-spread use and judicial and 
legislative acceptance of servitudes justifies a position that applies the concept of freedom 
of contract to creation of servitudes is now generally accepted.” Id. See also Korngold, 
supra note 114, § 10.01.   
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Restatement reflect a fundamental shift toward upholding the validity of 
all servitudes under principles of freedom of contract,117 but it also 
eliminates the potential obstacles of horizontal privity,118 the touch and 
concern doctrine,119 and the concern that perpetual affordability covenants 
will be found invalid as direct restraints on alienation.120 Unfortunately, 
judicial reliance on the Restatement has been slow to gain traction.121 
Nonetheless, the common law of servitudes has evolved over nearly five 
centuries.122 While relatively few cases so far have relied on the 
Restatement’s treatment of the touch and concern doctrine, abolition of 
horizontal privity, or unification of real covenants and equitable servitudes 
with a presumption of validity,123 numerous courts have discussed or 
considered the Restatement’s description of modern servitude law as it 
pertains to these topics.124 Perhaps more significantly, a review of case law 
 
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
118. See id. § 2.4. 
119. See id. § 3.2. 
120. See id. § 3.4. 
121. Note, supra note 96, at 938 (“As of this writing, only one line of cases has used 
the ALI’s new [public policy in lieu of the touch and concern] test.”). As of this writing, 
only the Washington Court of Appeals has cited to the Restatement (Servitudes) § 2.4 in 
support of the premise that privity is no longer required for the creation of a servitude. Lake 
Limerick Country Club v. Hunt Mfg. Homes, Inc., 120 Wash. App. 246, 259 (2004). Only 
courts in California and Texas have sited to the Restatement (Servitudes) § 3.1 in support 
of the premise that servitudes are valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or contrary to public 
policy. Cebular v. Cooper Arms Homeowners Ass’n, 142 Cal. App. 4th 106, 122 (2006); 
Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 538 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2008). No courts have cited or quoted the Restatement (Servitudes) § 3.2 to justify a claim 
that the touch and concern doctrine has been superseded. Six states have relied on 
Restatement (Servitudes) § 3.4 in determining whether a servitude was invalid as an 
unreasonable direct restraint on alienation, however, none of the cases involved 
affordability covenants. See Shaffer v. Bellows, 260 P.3d 1064, 1071–72 (Alaska 2011); 
Dye v. Diamente, 510 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Ark. 2017); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil 
and Gas Corp., 320 P.3d 1179, 1185 (Colo. 2014); Cape May Harbor Village & Yacht Club 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Sbraga, 421 N.J. Super. 56, 71–74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011); Navasota 
Resources, 249 S.W.3d at 538; SKI, Ltd. v. Mountainside Properties, Inc., 114 A.3d 1169, 
1178–79 (Vt. 2015). 
122. Most scholars trace the origins of real covenants at English common law to 
Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).  
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
124. As of this writing, the following courts have discussed or considered the 
Restatement’s position on the following: (1) that horizontal privity is no longer required 
for a real covenant to run with the land; and (2) that servitudes are presumed valid. No 
courts have discussed or considered the Restatement’s assertion that the touch-or-concern 
doctrine has been superseded. Horizontal privity: In re Energytec, Inc., 739 F.3d 215, 222–
23 (5th Cir. 2013); Wykeman Rise, L.L.C. v. Federer, 52 A.3d 702, 714–15 (Conn. 2012); 
Sonoma Dev., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579 (Va. 1999). Servitudes Presumed Valid: 
First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 
(10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003); Clinger v. Hartshorn, 89 P.3d 462, 468 
(Colo. App. 2003), Wykeman Rise, L.L.C. v. Federer, 52 A.3d 702, 714, 715 (Conn. 2012); 
Grovenburg v. Rustle Meadow Assocs., L.L.C. 165 A.3d 193, 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017); 
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related to affordability covenants suggests that courts tend to rule in 
accordance with the Restatement regardless of whether they rely, discuss, 
or even mention the Restatement.125 This suggests that at least as it pertains 
to affordability covenants, the Restatement’s perspective on the state of 
modern servitude law accurately reflects changing judicial norms about 
the enforceability of servitudes. 126   
B.  Affordability Covenants are Public Land Use Restrictions in 
Function, Not Form 
In the section above, the Article demonstrated how affordability 
covenants often do not meet all necessary common law requirements to 
“run with the land.” Although the Restatement approach significantly 
improves the legitimacy of affordability covenants at common law, and 
modern courts tend to enforce affordability covenants on public policy, 
contract, or equitable principles, significant risk remains in relying on the 
 
1515–19 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 43 P.3d 1233, 1238 
(Wash. 2002). 
125. The Restatement relies on Martin, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 632, in §3.4 comment h, 
explaining that affordability covenants are not unreasonable restraints on alienation so long 
as they are designed to further a legitimate purpose and the owner has a reasonable ability 
to convey the restricted unit. ); see generally Oceanside v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d. 
1420 (1989) The Restatement also relied on McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d. at 1420, in its 
comment h to §3.4, explaining the test for determining whether an affordability covenant 
is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. See also Columbus Park Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous. 
Pres. & Dev., 598 N.E.2d 702, 707 (N.Y. 1992) (relying on contract justifications to uphold 
multi-family rental housing affordability restrictions); Cannavaro v. Wash. Cmty. Hous., 
No. CV030091521S, 2005 WL 1433790, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 2005) (relying 
on the Restatement in combining real covenants, easements, and equitable servitudes under 
the single label “servitudes” and finding that servitudes can be validly created for the 
benefit of third parties appurtenant or in gross); Tivoli Stock L.L.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of 
Hous. Pres. Cmty. Dev., No. 108052/06, 2006 WL 3751468, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 
2006) (relying on contract and public policy rationales in upholding affordability 
restrictions); Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 112–
13 (2009) (discussing the court’s desire, but lack of authority, to adopt the Restatement’s 
supersession of the touch and concern doctrine, and deeming the doctrine satisfied because 
of contract and public policy rationales attributed to the appurtenant burden); Nordbye v. 
BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 225 (2011) (upholding running burden even 
though the benefit is held in gross by municipality and by third party beneficiaries); 135 
Wells Ave., L.L.C. v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 84 N.E.3d. 1257, 1267–68, 358–59 (Mass. 
2017) (upholding the validity of an affordability covenant where the benefit was held in 
gross by the municipality). 
126. In the final words of the Martin v. Villa Roma decision, in justifying its decision 
to uphold the affordability covenant at issue in the case, the California District Court of 
Appeal stated that “[affordability covenants] are imposed pursuant to federal requirements 
which, in any event, would take precedence over state law.” Martin, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 
635 (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981)). This off-hand justification for 
affordability covenants based in federal preemption has not been raised by other courts, 
legislatures, the Restatement, or other scholarly work, therefore, a thorough analysis of the 
claim is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is certainly an intriguing topic worthy 
of further investigation.  
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common law of property to ensure judicial enforceability of these 
servitudes. This Article next turns to public land use law as a possible 
means of shoring the enforcement of affordability covenants and other 
public/private land use devices. 
Zoning is fundamentally a public land use restriction.127 The Supreme 
Court defined zoning as “the general plan by which the city's territory is 
allotted to different uses . . . .”128 The Court upheld the constitutionality of 
zoning, generally, as a legitimate exercise of the state police power even 
though zoning necessarily means restricting the uses and, potentially, the 
value of privately owned real property.129 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
Ambler Realty challenged the validity of a municipality’s zoning 
ordinance, generally, arguing that any municipal regime that seeks to 
restrict Ambler’s land use rights as a private property was a violation of 
Ambler’s substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.130 In upholding the municipality’s zoning ordinance, which 
created exclusive, single family residential zones and other, more 
inclusive zones, the Court concluded that the municipality’s exercise of 
the police power in generally creating the zoning ordinance was not 
arbitrary or unreasonable.131 However, the Court left open the possibility 
of finding a specific zoning ordinance arbitrary or unreasonable when 
weighed against a specific harm to an individual landowner.132  
Since the early twentieth century more than 97% of cities with 5,000 
or more residents have enacted zoning ordinances.133 To protect against 
further constitutional challenges, states and municipalities typically adhere 
to relatively uniform procedural safeguards.134 For example, all 50 states 
have passed zoning enabling legislation that empowers municipalities 
within the state to implement a zoning regime.135 The vast majority of state 
enabling legislation is based on the Standard State Zoning Enabling 
 
127. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 517–21. 
128. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926). 
129. Id. at 395.  
130. See id. at 383–84. 
131. See id. at 392, 395. 
132. See id. at 395–96. 
133. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alt. to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines 
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 692 (1973); BARLOW BURKE, 
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 87 (2d ed. 2009). 
134. See BURKE, supra note 133, at 85. 
135. See DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 27, at 982–83; see Ellickson, supra note 
133, at 691–92; BURKE, supra note 133, at 87. In addition, according to the drafters of the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, “[a] general State enabling act is always advisable, 
and while the power to zone may, in some States, be derived from constitutional as 
distinguished from statutory home rule, still it is seldom that the home-rule power will 
cover all the necessary provisions for successful zoning.” STANDARD STATE ZONING 
ENABLING ACT (1928) (reprinted in AM. LAW INST., MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968) https://bit.ly/2kJm2eQ. 
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Legislation, which was first published as a suggestion for states by the 
United States Department of Commerce in 1924.136 These state enabling 
statutes not only authorize municipalities to create zoning ordinances that 
segregate land according to use and area restrictions,137 but they also 
establish a uniform regulatory framework to be carried out by two 
regulatory bodies, a zoning commission138 and a board of zoning 
adjustment,139 to ensure that due process is protected in the municipal 
exercise of the zoning power.140 Both the ordinance enactment and 
proceedings of the administrative bodies are usually subject to additional 
administrative procedures to safeguard the constitutionality of the 
municipal action. For example, passage or amendment of the zoning 
ordinance may be subject to public notice and comment or hearings.141 
Additionally, hearings held by the zoning commission and the board of 
zoning adjustment are typically subject to procedural due process 
requirements such as the right to notice, the right to cross examine 
witnesses, and the right to appeal.142 
1. Formalistic Differences Between Affordability 
Covenants and Zoning 
At first blush, perpetual affordability covenants and zoning seem to 
be quite dissimilar enterprises.143 This stems from their formalistic 
differences.144 After all, perpetual affordability covenants arise under 
contract, by mutual consent of the contracting parties, as a private 
agreement to restrict the use of a specific piece of real estate. In contrast, 
zoning is a public legislative and administrative process that sets 
 
136. DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 27, at 982–83; see STANDARD STATE ZONING 
ENABLING ACT (1928) (reprinted in AM. LAW INST., MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968) 
137.  For example, in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, “[t]he legislative body 
of [municipalities] is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of 
stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percent of lot that may be occupied, 
the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location 
and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes 
. . . .” Id.. . . .” STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1928) (reprinted in AM. LAW 
INST., MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210 Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968) 
138. The legislative body appoints a zoning commission “to recommend boundaries 
of the various original districts and appropriate regulations to be enforced therein.” Id. at 
217. 
139. The board of adjustment may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate 
conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
Id. at 218. 
140. See BURKE, supra note 133, at 76. 
141. See id. at 85. 
142. See id. at 157. 
143. See 5 RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §82.2 (4th ed. (2019)). 
144. See id. 
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parameters for land uses across an entire municipality in accordance with 
an overarching comprehensive plan intended to serve the long-term public 
interest of the jurisdiction.145  
Beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, however, zoning 
innovations have begun to look more like private land use arrangements 
in form.146 For example, zoning regulations for overlay districts are “often 
equally as detailed as the private covenants seen in suburban 
subdivisions.”147 Zoning for specific projects, as in Planned Unit 
Development approvals and conditional zoning, are often negotiated like 
private contracts.148 These types of innovative, non-Euclidean, zones are 
intended to give zoning administrators both more flexibility and control 
over permitted uses on discreet parcels of land.149  For example, mandatory 
Inclusionary Zoning laws typically require developers to set aside a 
portion of their developments as affordable housing and in exchange 
provide the developments with economic benefits like density bonuses or 
tax exemptions.150 
At the same time, affordability covenants are beginning to look a bit 
more like public land use restrictions in that they are often required by 
statute or regulation and are based on templates provided by the 
municipality with little room for negotiation.151  Similarly, many 
affordable housing “deals” which give rise to affordability covenants are 
imbued with a certain halo of procedural due process in that developers of 
subsidized housing often compete for public subsidy and are selected by a 
public body in accordance with published selection criteria and a 
jurisdictional plan.152 In addition to obtaining zoning entitlements by a 
zoning commission, to win competitions for public resources, affordable 
housing developments must often show compatibility with other types of 
municipal planning, such as an agency affordable housing plan, a smart 
growth plan, or a comprehensive plan.153  
 
145. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 517–21.  
146. See Noah Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Governments’ Use of 
Covenants to Regulate Land Use, 124 YALE L.J. 1790, 1801 (2015). 
147. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 719 
(2010). 
148. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 625–27.  
149. See BURKE, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROP. LAW 785 (2015).  
150. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated 
Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 906 (2006).  
151. See, e.g., New Jersey’s Model Affordability Covenant, N.J.A.C. 5:80-26 App. 
A (2004).  
152. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30(g) (West 2017). 
153. See, e.g., CITY OF N.Y, DEP’T. OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., 2018 LOW INCOME HOUS. 
TAX CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 20 (2018); KATHLEEN PATTERSON, LOW-
RANKED PROJECTS SECURE AFFORDABLE HOUSING FUNDS, A REPORT BY THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA AUDITOR (May 30, 2019), https://bit.ly/2kz6DOk (criticizing the lack of 
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2. Functional Similarities Between Affordability Covenants 
and Zoning 
The formalistic differences between affordability covenants and 
zoning may obscure the more important functional similarities. When a 
public body sets about assembling a privately-owned stock of perpetually 
affordable housing, the public body is implementing a system of public 
land use control. The municipality is allocating public resources for the 
purpose of creating a public benefit – a durable stock of affordable 
housing. As discussed above, the courts that have enforced affordability 
covenants have occasionally grappled with the ill-fitting requirements for 
real covenants and equitable servitudes,154 but have typically relied, 
implicitly or explicitly, on the legitimate public purpose the covenant is 
intended to further. 155 One of the clearest articulations of this public policy 
justification can be found in the California Supreme Court’s rationale for 
upholding the City of San Jose’s Inclusionary Zoning ordinance where the 
Court drew a parallel between the broad police power of a jurisdiction to 
engage in zoning and the broad police power of a jurisdiction to impose 
affordability restrictions through an Inclusionary Zoning ordinance.156 
Notably, the case is argued and decided in the headier plane of deciding 
whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power or a 
regulatory taking; there is no discussion of the functional validity of the 
servitudes required by the ordinance to secure the on-going affordability 
of subject units.157   
In the rare instances where courts have considered the functional 
validity of affordability covenants, some courts have nevertheless resorted 
to public policy rationales for finding the covenants enforceable rather 
than applying the common law tests for running covenants or equitable 
servitudes. For example, in Martin v. Villa Roma and Oceanside v. 
McKenna, the California Court of Appeals concluded that affordability 
covenants are not void as unreasonable restraints on alienation because 
“they support rather than offend the policies of [California].”158 In Reikse, 
 
transparency in awarding funds to affordable housing developers without a transparent 
process). 
154. Oceanside v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1426 (1989); Columbus Park 
Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 598 N.E.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. 1992); Cannavaro v. 
Wash. Cmty. Hous., No. CV030091521S, 2005 WL 1433790, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
May 23, 2005); Tivoli Stock L.L.C., 2006 WL 3751468, at *6; Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. at 110–
14; Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 225 (2011).; 135 Wells Ave., 
L.L.C., 84 N.E.3d. at 1268–69. 
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
156. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1000 (Cal. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).  
157. Id.  
158. Martin v. Villa Roma, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635 (1982); McKenna, 215 
Cal. App. 3d at 1428.  
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the court grappled with the specific requirements for real covenants and 
equitable servitudes at common law.159 After lamenting its lack of 
authority to adopt the Restatement’s position superseding the “touch and 
concern” requirement for real covenants, the court went on to pointedly 
interpret the touch and concern requirement broadly enough to encompass 
an affordability restriction to which the county housing development 
agency is a party.160  The Reikse court explained that a narrow 
interpretation of the touch and concern requirement would have resulted 
in frustrating the legislative intent of the state’s affordable housing 
statute.161  As discussed above, in California Building Industry Ass’n, the 
court upheld an Inclusionary Zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the 
police power without analyzing the validity of the tools intended to secure 
the affordability of individual units. The court in Tivoli Stock L.L.C. v. 
N.Y.C Department of Housing and Community Devevelopment, makes it 
clear that an agency’s decision regarding the release of a specific covenant 
is also action pursuant to the police power, subject to rational basis review 
like other quasi-legislative actions related to zoning.162 Of course, ensuring 
the provision of decent, safe, and affordable housing has been recognized 
as a legitimate public policy objective for governmental agencies since 
1934.163 However, courts have not yet directly and decisively addressed 
the fundamental legitimacy of a public land use control system based on 
affordability covenants.  
C.  Affordability Covenants Belong Among a Set of New, 
“Hybrid” Public/Private Land Use Controls 
The sections above showed that affordability covenants are neither 
real covenants nor public land use controls. Instead, they are some kind of 
hybrid. In this subsection, the Article reviews the literature related to other 
“hybrid” public/private land use devices such as conservation servitudes, 
conditional zoning, and development agreements to better understand this 
unconventional set of devices.  
When a municipality uses private, negotiated agreements, such as 
covenants, to allocate public resources or to issue conditional zoning or 
permitting approvals, it can be difficult to ascertain whether the 
municipality is exercising its contracting power or its police power.164 
 
159. See Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. at 109–11. (2009).  
160. Id. at 112–13.  
161. Id.  
162. Tivoli Stock L.L.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., No. 108052/06, 
2006 WL 3751468, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2006). 
163. National Housing Act of 1943, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934); United States Housing Act 
of 1937, 50 Stat. 888 (1937); see, e.g., 2910 Ga. Ave. L.L.C. v. District of Columbia et al., 
234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 312 (2017). 
164. See Wegner, supra note 28, at 958. 
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Depending on how state contract and police powers are blended, municipal 
action can be “basically legitimate or fundamentally flawed.”165  
Property and land use law scholar, Professor Judith Welch Wegner, 
examines this question in two contexts. First, she addresses the use of 
contingent zoning, where a jurisdiction agrees to rezone a parcel of land 
contingent upon the landowner’s entering into agreements or covenants 
with other parties to develop the land in a specific way. Second, she 
examines, the use of development agreements, where a public body agrees 
to provide public benefits, such as land, financing, or tax relief, to a 
developer in exchange for the developer’s promises related to a 
development project or off-site improvements.166  Professor Wegner 
concludes that crucial to the success of these “hybrid” land use devices is 
the articulation of substantive standards, codified in state legislation and 
local ordinances, about when and how the tools are to be used,167 and 
procedural standards including public participation and judicial 
oversight.168   
Conservation servitudes have also been described as “hybrid” land 
use devices. 169 Environmental law scholar Professor Jessica Owley has 
described conservation servitudes as “hybrids of property law, contract 
law and zoning.”170 Environmental science scholars Mary Ann King and 
Professor Sally Fairfax have described conservation easements as “blurred 
mosaics of public and private land ownership and management 
priorities.”171 Conservation easements have much in common with 
affordability covenants. Like affordability covenants, conservation 
servitudes are a later-twentieth century innovation that do not satisfy 
common law requirements for real covenants or equitable servitudes 
because the benefit of the servitude is held in-gross and they are often of 
 
165. Id. at 965. 
166. See id. at 961–62. 
167. See id. at 1014. 
168. See id. at 986–88. 
169. Conservation servitudes are also sometimes called conservation easements or 
restrictions. As explained by Gerald Korngold, these private land use restrictions in-gross 
most closely resemble the traditional definition of servitudes, so that is what they are called 
throughout this paper. See Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 436–
37. Notably, the drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”), adopted 
by 23 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia, explicitly rejects this 
approach and maintains that they are easements, not real covenants or equitable servitudes. 
See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1980) (amended 2007).  
170. Owley, supra note 23, at 137. 
171. Mary Ann King & Sally Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation 
Easements: Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 65, 69 (2006). 
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perpetual duration.172 Moreover, their creation is encouraged by federal 
law,173 and they appear to put unreasonable restraints on alienation.174 
Unlike affordability covenants, scholars have been quite concerned with 
ensuring the enforceability of conservation servitudes since the early 
1980s.175 This scholarly attention may be due, in part, to the significant 
amount of litigation involving conservation servitudes and their 
enforcement.176  
As environmental law scholar Peter Morrisette explains: 
Because the common law of servitudes does not provide for negative 
easements or servitudes held in gross that run with the land in perpetuity, 
states have enacted enabling statutes that provide for conservation 
easements. These statutes eliminate many of the common law 
impediments to conservation easements—such as the restriction against 
negative easements held in gross, as well as privity, and touch and 
concern requirements.177   
Indeed, to ensure the validity of conservation servitudes, given their 
shortcomings in meeting common law servitude requirements, at least 37 
states have passed conservation easement statutes,178 25 of them based on 
the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”).179  
The UCEA is short and simple.180 Its purpose is limited to “sweeping 
away certain common law impediments that might otherwise undermine a 
conservation easement’s validity.”181 The drafters of the UCEA intended 
that states would insert the act into their property laws as enabling 
legislation.182 Indeed, 23 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of 
 
172. To receive federal income tax benefits, a conservation easement must be 
perpetual. 26 U.S.C. §170(h)(5)(A) (2019).  
173. The federal tax code creates a tax benefit for land subject to perpetual 
conservation easements. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2019). 
174. Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 455. As with 
Affordability Covenants, the Restatement creates a specific exemption for conservation 
servitudes in its rule related to unreasonable restraints on alienation. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
175. See Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 433; see also 
Owley, supra note 23, at 121; King & Fairfax, supra note 171, at 65. 
176. As an illustration, Massachusetts has a single enabling statute for conservation, 
preservation, and affordable housing restrictions that run with the land. 184 MASS. GEN. 
LAWS § 32 (2019). Of the 35 cases related to this statute as of the date of writing this article, 
26 related to conservation restrictions, 9 related to agricultural preservation restrictions, 
and only 1 related tangentially to affordable housing restrictions. Id.  
177. Morrisette, supra note 23, at 384. 
178. Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 438. 
179. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) 
(amended 2007). 
180. Id.  
181. Id. § 3. 
182. Id.  
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Columbia have done just that.183 The other 27 states have enacted their 
own conservation easement enabling legislation.184 In contrast, only 6 
states have passed similar statutes intended to ensure the validity of 
affordable housing covenants, there is no uniform or model act.185   
In sum, long-term affordability covenants are “hybrid” public/private 
land use devices similar to the contingent zoning, development 
agreements, and conservation servitudes. However, in these other 
“hybrid” forms, concern about common law validity has led to significant 
progress in enacting state enabling legislation. While all jurisdictions 
require the use of affordability covenants as conditions for receipt of 
public subsidy, only 6 states have passed legislation explicitly authorizing 
affordability covenants as a valid device regardless of common law 
obstacles to their enforceability described above. 
D.  Summary and Segue from Law to Policy 
As Professor Gerald Korngold has explained, public ownership of 
land is significantly more expensive than public restriction of that land 
through private, opt-in land use controls like servitudes.186 Federal 
affordable housing policy has embraced this shift to privately owned, 
privately restricted housing since the Johnson administration187 by capping 
the growth of publicly owned public housing programs and pivoting to 
 
183. Id.  
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Ch. 161); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-101 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 6902 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 704.05 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-1 (2019); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §198-1 (2019); 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 33/1 (West, Westlaw 
through P.A. 101-65); IOWA CODE ANN. § 457A (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:1271 (1987);2018); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROPERTY § 2-118 
(amended 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,111 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31–32 (West, Westlaw through ch. 64 except 
ch. 47 of the 2019 Annual Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 324.8204 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Reg. Sess. No. 47); MO. ANN. STAT. §442.014 (West, Westlaw through 2019 
Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-201 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 477:45 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Ch. 175); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 5:80-26.1 (2019); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSER. LAW § 49-0301 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
113A-230 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 61-15-04 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5301.63 (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §49.1 (2019); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-
39.1 et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Ch. 310); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-
301 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-1 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess.); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 610 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 64.4.130 & 76.09.040 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
185. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
186. Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 461. 
187. See generally Alexander von Hoffman, History Lessons for Today’s Housing 
Policy: The Political Process of Making Low-Income Housing Policy 26 (Joint Center for 
Housing Studies, Harvard Univ. 2012). 
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publicly subsidized but privately owned housing.188 While affordability 
covenants are generally used as private land use control devices to secure 
public investment, they oftentimes fail to satisfy the requirements for 
enforceability according to common law property rules. The limited case 
law on the enforceability of these covenants suggests that courts are 
inclined to overlook these common law deficiencies and enforce the 
covenants on public policy grounds, at least for the time being.  
Indeed, the valid public purpose and furtherance of public policy 
objectives belie a formal characterization of these covenants as private 
land use restrictions. They are better characterized as a hybrid of public 
and private land use restrictions, like environmental servitudes, contingent 
zoning, and development agreements. State legislatures and localities 
often overcome the shortcoming of conservation easements, contingent 
zoning, and development agreements as private land use devices by 
bolstering the instruments as public land use devices. In other words, 
legislatures and localities legitimize the exercise of state police and 
contract power through specific enabling legislation and regulations 
intended to institute substantive and procedural due process safeguards. 
Such bolstering of affordability covenants as public land use devices is 
uncommon; without it, covenants intended to secure billions of dollars of 
public investment may be found unenforceable. The next part of this 
Article analyzes the six existing affordability covenant enabling statutes, 
together with the UCEA, to address some of the basic substantive concerns 
that an affordability covenant enabling statute should address.  
III.  ENABLING LEGISLATION IS ESSENTIAL TO SECURE THE VALIDITY 
OF AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS 
Part II of this Article takes a critical look at what enabling legislation, 
as a tool of public land use restriction, must do to achieve its purpose in 
creating valid and enforceable perpetual affordability covenants. It begins 
with an analysis of the six existing affordability covenant enabling statutes 
and the UCEA. This Article concludes that although the existing 
affordability covenant enabling acts are certainly better than nothing, mere 
codification may defer (but not resolve) the legitimate problems that 
affordability covenants create as private land use restrictions. Rather, 
enabling legislation should first distinguish the state contract and police 
power being implemented and then provide procedural and substantive 
due process to support the valid use of these state powers. The parameters 
of these powers are first sketched by looking to zoning and regulatory 
takings jurisprudence. Finally, this Article considers two different 
fundamental policy goals within the parameters of enforceability that 
 
188. Id. at 46. 
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policymakers should choose between. One goal is aimed at suppressing 
the value of affordability-covenant-restricted properties to essentially 
remove those properties from the mainstream real estate market. The other 
goal is to not necessarily remove affordability covenant restricted 
properties from the mainstream market, but instead to carve off and 
capture the market value of the covenant for the benefit of the 
municipality.  
A. The UCEA Provides a Framework for Affordability 
Covenant Enabling Statutes 
The UCEA has been enormously influential in educating and 
mobilizing states about the need for state enabling statutes to ensure the 
enforceability of conservation easements. It has been so successful, in fact, 
that at least one state has looked to the UCEA as a model for affordability 
covenant enabling legislation.189 The UCEA provides some useful 
guidance to states and localities in legitimizing the public land use aspect 
of hybrid land use devices, first and foremost, by confronting the fact that 
these hybrid devices are vulnerable to judicial findings of invalidity at 
common law and remedying that problem with enabling legislation.190 In 
attempting to design a model statute that can be easily adopted by all 
states, the UCEA drafters followed several guiding principles. First, they 
limited the act to achieving one limited, but most essential, goal191 (namely 
curing deficiencies of conservation easements at common law via enabling 
legislation). Second, the uniform act is short and simple. The first principle 
makes the second principle possible. Everything in the UCEA is necessary 
to achieve the first principle but goes no further.192 Third, to the extent that 
the uniform act must define terms, it does so only in furtherance of the first 
principle. The intent behind the second and third principles is to encourage 
states to adopt the law with few revision and to insert it, specifically, into 
the state’s property laws193 so that there is uniformity between state laws 
and, hopefully, greater interstate judicial conformity of interpretation.194 
 
189. See M.R.S. 33 §§ 121–26 (1991). 
190. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1980) (amended 2007). 
191. Id. (“The Act has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away certain 
common law impediments which might otherwise undermine the easements’ validity, 
particularly those held in gross.”) 
192. Id. (“The Act does not address a number of issues which, though of conceded 
importance, are considered extraneous to its primary objective of enabling private parties 
to enter into consensual arrangements with charitable organizations or governmental 
bodies to protect land and buildings without the encumbrance of certain potential common 
law impediments.”) 
193. Id. § 3. (“[T]he Act is intended to be placed in the real property law of adopting 
states . . . .”) 
194. Id. § 6. 
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The UCEA does not explicitly address the public land use aspects of 
conservation easements, but treats conservation easements as private 
agreements where the holder of the covenant happens to be limited to 
charitable organizations and governmental bodies who must consent to 
any obligations or duties related to the benefit of the easement.195  
In commentary, the drafters of the UCEA explained that a public 
process was intentionally omitted so as not to create a chilling effect on 
the creation of conservation easements through a mandated governmental 
approval process.196 The drafters rationalized their decision and explained 
that any eligible beneficiary of a conservation easement would likely have 
an administrative process related to accepting obligations contained in an 
easement.197  Nevertheless, the drafters of the UCEA implicitly assumed 
that the justification for the validity of these easements was to serve the 
public interest.198   
Though conservation easements and affordability covenants both 
seem to fit into the new constellation of hybrid public/private land use 
devices, there are some notable differences between the tools. For 
example, the drafters of the UCEA were concerned that a public process 
would have a chilling effect on the creation of conservation servitudes.199  
In contrast, affordability covenants are created as a precondition to 
something a developer seeks from a public body (land, financing, zoning 
or permitting approval) in accordance with a public processes pre-existing 
the affordability covenants. The concern that a public process related to 
the affordability covenant would have a chilling effect on the creation of 
affordability covenants is unfounded. However, precisely because 
affordability covenants are a product of the public contract and police 
powers, they may be more likely attacked as regulatory takings or as 
unconscionable.  
At least two jurisdictions, Maine and Massachusetts, are aware of the 
similarities between conservation servitudes and affordability covenants. 
Maine’s affordability covenant statute closely tracks the UCEA and 
appears to have used the UCEA as its template.200 For example, the statute 
has a mere six sections that match the titles of the UCEA sections,201 it is 
located in Maine’s property law,202 it is limited in scope to defining certain 
 
195. Id. § 2(b). 
196. Id. at prefatory note. 
197. Id.  
198. Id. § 2 (“[E]asements may be created only for certain purposes intended to serve 
the public interest . . . .”) 
199. Id. at prefatory note. 
200. See M.R.S. 33 §§ 121–26 (1991); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 
prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) (amended 2007). 
201. M.R.S. 33 §§ 121–26 (1991). 
202. Id.  
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key terms and to enabling affordability covenants by overriding common 
law impediments to enforcement,203 and it limits “qualified holders” of the 
benefit of a covenant to certain kinds of governmental bodies and 
nonprofit organizations.204 Likewise, Massachusetts acknowledges the 
similarities between affordability covenants and conservation, 
preservation, and agricultural servitudes by defining them together in the 
same statute as “restrictions.”205 Massachusetts has also exempted them 
from the validity requirements of more traditional servitudes,206 legislated 
over common law impediments to enforcement,207 instituted due process 
safeguards to protect the public interest,208 and created a combined 
recording index for these public interest restrictions.209  
Other jurisdictions with affordability covenant enabling legislation 
also seem to have recognized the similarities between these covenants and 
the UCEA. For example, when the Oregon legislature passed its 
affordability covenant enabling act in 2007, it recognized that although 
affordability covenants are being implemented in the state, without 
specific enabling legislation, the covenants were vulnerable to judicial 
challenge.210 The Oregon statute, along with Rhode Island’s affordability 
covenant enabling act, seems to be modeled after the UCEA. Specifically, 
the Oregon and Rhode Island acts are inserted in the state housing laws,211 
define affordability covenants,212 address who has standing to enforce 
affordability covenants,213 and specifically declare affordability covenants 
valid despite inconsistences with common law requirements.214 
California’s affordability covenant enabling act is tied to the creation 
of its Low and Moderate Income Housing Trust Fund215 and simply makes 
the affordability covenants required in the section binding on the 
covenanter and all successors “[n]otwithstanding any other law.”216 
Vermont’s enabling act is almost as simple as California’s. It is located in 
 
203. See ME. STAT. tit. 33, §§ 121, 122, 124 (1991). 
204. See ME. STAT. tit. 33, § 121(3) (1991). 
205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (West 1990). 
206. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 26 (West 1990). 
207. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 1990). 
208. See id.  
209. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 33 (West 1990). 
210. See H.R. 3485c, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).  
211. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 456.270–.295 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 34-39.1-1 et seq. (West 1991). 
212. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.270 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-
39.1-3 (West 1991). 
213. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.280–285 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 34-39.1-3 (West 2006). 
214. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.290 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-
39.1-4 (West 2006). 
215. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f).  
216. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f)(7). 
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Vermont’s marketable title act.217 After defining what an affordability 
covenant is,218 it simply states that the covenant shall be enforceable 
according to its terms.219 
Unquestionably, the six states that have passed affordability covenant 
enabling legislation have taken a significant step in shoring the 
enforceability of their states’ affordability covenants. Interestingly, there 
has been virtually no litigation involving these six enabling acts.220 While 
two of the enabling acts include legislative findings or purpose sections to 
establish the public purpose that justifies the use of the state police power 
in creating the act,221 only one jurisdiction seems to have followed the 
example of the UCEA in eschewing creation of a public processes in their 
enabling acts and treating these enabling acts as essentially legislative 
inoculation for private land use agreements.222  
The fear of chilling the creation of conservation easements, the 
reason the UCEA drafters avoided discussion of a public process as 
discussed above, is inapplicable to affordability covenants where 
participation in a public process antecedes the covenant. Public land use 
jurisprudence suggests that rather than ignoring the public process 
involved in the creation of affordability covenants, jurisdictions should 
articulate a public process that establishes substantive and procedural due 
process safeguards to assist the judiciary in upholding the acts should they 
be challenged in court. 223 
B. Parameters of the Public Police and Contract Powers 
In her excellent essay, “Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: 
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical 
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals,” Professor Wegner takes her 
readers on a deep dive into the theoretical underpinnings of public/private 
land use arrangements.224 Professor Wegner considers two kinds of 
public/private land use arrangements, or “deals,” contingent zoning, and 
 
217. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 610 (West 1995). 
218. See id. § 610(a). 
219. See id.  § 610(e). 
220. There are two Vermont cases related to property tax assessed values of restricted 
properties. See generally Franks v. Town of Essex, 87 A.3d 418 (Vt. 2013); Laterre House 
Ltd. v. Town of Wilmington, No. 2001–341, 2002 WL 34423628, at *1 (Vt. 2002). Of the 
35 cases related to Massachusetts’s restriction enabling statute, only one is tangentially 
related to affordability covenants. See City of Boston v. Roxbury Action Program, Inc., 
862 N.E.2d 763, 766–67 n. 8, 9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
221. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.275 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-
39.1-2 (West 2006). 
222. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.275 (West 2010) 
223. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474–75 
(Fla. 1993).  
224. See Wegner, supra note 28, at 957. 
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development agreements.225 She insightfully notes that in entering into 
these public/private deals, jurisdictions are exercising a blend of contract 
power and police power.226 Professor Wegner looks to the reserved powers 
doctrine of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution to define 
the parameters of legitimate state contract/police action in land use 
deals.227 She notes that where state action is found to violate the reserved 
powers doctrine, there is (1) the absence of reasonably clear government 
authority, (2) marginal or unwarranted private expectations (for example, 
about the role of the public body and its regulatory duties or authority to 
contract), and (3) a strong, circumstance- and time-dependent public 
interest that has been affected adversely.228 In parsing judicial reception of 
contingent zoning and development agreements, Professor Wegner finds 
that when these public/private deals have been upheld, they have satisfied 
the test outlined above with procedural and substantive safeguards. For 
example, procedural safeguards for contingent zoning and development 
agreements include procedures defined by statutes or ordinances, notice 
and hearing requirements, super-majority voting, recordation, and an 
independent legislative body.229 Substantive safeguards include 
conformity with a comprehensive plan and other legitimate public land use 
goals.230 
 Professor Wegner’s delineation of the parameters of the legitimate 
exercise of the public contract and police powers in public/private land use 
deals is further informed by the United States Supreme Court development 
exactions cases of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,231  and Dolan v. City of Tigard.232 Nollan and Dolan 
are both cases where property owners were asked by local permitting 
authorities to give up an interest in their land in exchange for building 
permit approval.233 In holding the easement requirement in Nollan an 
unconstitutional taking, the Supreme Court explained that there must be a 
nexus between the condition or property interest sought by the government 
authority and the problem caused by the proposed development that must 
 
225. Id.  
226. See id. at 965. 
227. See id. at 965–68. 
228. See id. at 967. 
229. See id. at 986–88, 1009. 
230. See Wegner, supra note 28, at 989. 
231. See generally Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
232. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).  
233. The Nollans were asked to grant a public easement along their private beachfront 
parallel with the ocean as a condition to getting a residential building permit. Nollan, 483 
U.S. at 828. Similarly, Ms. Dolan was asked to dedicate part of her land to the city for flood 
control and a public bike path as a condition to getting a commercial building permit. 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379–80. 
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be alleviated.234 Dolan extends Nollan one more logical step—not only 
must there be a qualitative relationship between the condition sought by 
the governmental body and the problem caused by the proposed 
development that must be alleviated, but there must be a quantitative 
nexus, or “rough proportionality,” between the condition sought and the 
harm created by the development.235 For example, in Dolan, the Supreme 
Court found the city failed to demonstrate that the public greenway it 
demanded from Dolan in exchange for a building permit would 
proportionally off-set or alleviate the amount of increased traffic that 
Dolan’s development was projected to cause.236  
The existing affordability covenant enabling acts accurately describe 
the covenants as interests in land granted to either governmental bodies or 
certain non-profit housing organizations in exchange for zoning or 
permitting approval or public funds. In addition to Professor Wegner’s 
observation that public/private land deals should be supported by 
procedural and substantive safeguards, affordability covenant enabling 
legislation should also include safeguards to ensure that the conditions and 
restrictions imposed by affordability covenants are qualitatively and 
quantitatively justifiable in relation to the impact of the development. 
Although courts have rejected the assertion that mandated production of 
deed-restricted affordable housing pursuant to an Inclusionary Zoning 
statute is subject to Nollan/Dolan analysis,237 Justice Thomas has made 
clear his dissatisfaction with what he considers an arbitrary distinction 
between legislative action and executive action in classifying takings.238 
After considering how enabling legislation should legitimize the 
combined public contracting and police powers at play in affordability 
covenants, the final sections of this Article explore two different 
fundamental policy goals for creating a perpetual affordability covenant 
land use regime. 
C. Affordability Covenant Enabling Statutes Face a Unique 
Question Regarding Their Essential Policy Goal  
For conservation easements, the essential goal underlying the 
creation of this public/private land use tool is to enable the creation of a 
stock of privately owned, permanently restricted parcels of real estate that 
 
234. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
235. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395–96. 
236. See id. at 395. 
237. 2910 Ga. Ave., L.L.C. v. District of Columbia et al., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 299, 
305 (D.D.C. 2017); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 991 (Cal. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).  
238. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. at 928–29. 
ART 2 - PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2019  4:09 PM 
2019] PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS  97 
preserves open green space or natural habitat in perpetuity.239 This “real 
estate stock” approach is baked into federal tax incentives, which only 
apply to lands subject to perpetual conservation easements.240 It is also 
baked into the UCEA, which assumes that a conservation easement is 
“unlimited in duration” unless otherwise specified.241 For the handful of 
jurisdictions currently imposing permanent affordability covenants on 
privately owned but publicly subsidized affordable housing property, the 
underlying purpose seems similarly oriented toward creating a permanent 
stock of real estate that will be limited to use as affordable housing 
forever.242 Under this view, the jurisdiction’s goal is long-term 
suppression of the value of the property subject to the covenant.243 This 
Article will refer to this as the “value suppression approach.” However, 
there is another essential policy goal that can serve as the foundation for 
perpetual affordability restrictions. That is, creating a portfolio of fungible 
interests in land to be owned by the municipality as capital assets.244 This 
Article will refer to this second approach as the “value capture approach.” 
This section explores the benefits and drawbacks of each essential policy 
goal and their ramifications for enabling statutes. 
1. Value Suppression Approach  
a. Benefits of the Value Suppression Approach 
There are many benefits associated with the value suppression 
approach to perpetual affordability covenants. By effectively removing a 
piece of real estate from the general market, a jurisdiction need not 
 
239. There are legal scholars who question the wisdom of allowing conservation 
easements in perpetuity. See Owley, supra note 23, at 121. However, the clear trend is that 
conservation easements are created with perpetual terms to qualify for the federal tax 
deduction. 
240. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2017).  
241. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 2(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) 
(amended 2007). 
242. See COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, LONG-TERM HOUSING AFFORDABILITY FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4–10 (2017), https://bit.ly/2QEVg2X (discussing Boston’s 
long-term capital reinvestment approach to its perpetually restricted, privately owned 
affordable housing stock); see also Stephanie Sosa, HPD Takes An Important Step 
Forward for “Permanent Affordability,” ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., INC. 
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2JOwVHf; see also PHIL MENDELSON, REPORT ON PR21-125, 
“965 FLORIDA AVE., N.W., DISPOSITION APPROVAL RESOLUTION OF 2015,” P.R. Doc. No. 
21–125, at 6–7 (2015), https://bit.ly/2Wce62i. 
243. See Permanent Affordability: Practical Solutions, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & 
HOUS. DEV., INC. WHITE PAPER 8 (2015), https://bit.ly/2IficSv (“[U]p to 30% of . . . subsidy 
is spent on preserving the affordability of existing projects. And much of this subsidy is 
. . . put toward compensating the property owners for the increased property values, in 
order to compete with the private market.”). 
244. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); 
see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.280(6) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.). 
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compete in a gentrifying market merely to preserve existing housing 
stock.245 The Chinatown preservation conundrum at the beginning of this 
Article is averted.246 By locking in specific pieces of real estate as 
perpetually affordable, maintaining housing for low-income residents in 
perpetuity, economic and (potentially) cultural diversity is preserved.  
A perpetual affordability covenant’s effectiveness at suppressing 
market value of the burdened real estate will be dependent upon the 
likelihood of release of the covenant. At common law, covenants are 
released upon merger, formal release, expiration, laches, estoppel, 
abandonment, acquiescence, prescription, unclean hands, or upon a 
finding of changed conditions.247 A covenant may also be terminated due 
to a marketable title act.248 Creating an affordability covenant with a 
perpetual term obviously eliminates the possibility of termination by 
expiration of term. Legislation enabling perpetual affordability covenants 
should seek to limit these common law and statutory methods of releasing 
to the greatest extent practicable. For example, the UCEA and the Maine 
Affordable Housing Covenant Act, which is based on the UCEA, both 
provide that the easement or covenant enabled by the act can be terminated 
in the same ways as other easements or covenants,249 and that courts are 
empowered to modify or terminate covenants in accordance with the 
principles of law and equity.250 This language preserves the ability for 
covenants to be terminated in all ways except expiration of term.  
A jurisdiction adopting a value suppression model should design its 
statute to make covenant termination difficult. This can be done directly, 
by eliminating accidental forms of termination, such as prescription and 
laches, and by placing high procedural hurdles on termination by release. 
For example, in Massachusetts, an affordability covenant can only be 
released by the Department of Housing following a public hearing, a 
determination of the public interest and accordance with the 
comprehensive plan, and payment by the burdened party to repurchase the 
property interest created by the covenant.251  
 
245. See Permanent Affordability: Practical Solutions, supra note 243, at 8.  
246. See Phil Mendelson, supra note 242, at 6–7. 
247. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 927. 
248. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 900 (eighteen states have 
“marketable record title” acts that simply make void any recorded document older than a 
statutorily defined number of years, typically between 20 and 40 years). 
249. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1980) (amended 2007). ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §122.1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Sess.). 
250. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, §3(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1980) (amended 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 123.3 (West, Westlaw through 
2018). 
251. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.). 
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Termination of a covenant can also be made more difficult indirectly 
by granting broad standing for enforcement. For example, in Nordbye v. 
BRCP/GM Ellington, the local housing agency and all past, present, and 
future tenants of the housing complex who met income criteria for 
residency in the affordable housing complex had standing to enforce the 
affordability restrictions applicable to the housing complex.252 The court 
concluded that  the housing agency’s written consent to release the 
affordability covenant did not prevent income eligible past, present, or 
future tenants from enforcing the covenant.253  
b. Value Suppression Approach Drawbacks  
There are numerous costs or potential problems associated with the 
value suppression approach. The first problem is potentially chilling 
private investment. The shift from publicly owned to privately owned 
affordable housing in the latter half of the twentieth century sprung from 
a desire to encourage private financing as much as possible so that public 
funds merely leverage private investment and fill funding gaps between 
project costs and what private financial institutions are willing to 
finance.254 Today, most private financing of affordable housing is 
privately underwritten assuming that unrestricted, market rate rents, or 
resale values will be available upon foreclosure or certain other 
extraordinary scenarios.255 If permanent affordability covenants are 
intended to permanently move real estate into a separate, value restricted 
class of property, the amount of private funding available per project may 
reflect this change and result in the need for greater public subsidy.  
Indeed, advocates for perpetual restrictions and affordable housing 
providers in Boston have confirmed that perpetual covenants reduce the 
amount of private financing available for initial construction as well as 
capital replacements–requiring greater public subsidy at initial 
construction and throughout the life of the project.256 This results in the 
creation and preservation of fewer units of affordable housing in the 
jurisdiction, overall.   
 
252. Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 215–16 (2011). 
253. Id. at 222. 
254. A Brief Historical Overview of Affordable Rental Housing, NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUS. COAL. 1–6 (2015), https://bit.ly/2JPFWQe. 
255. The affordability restrictions imposed by the federal Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit Program terminate upon foreclosure or, in lieu of foreclosure, deed. 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 42; I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(E)(i)(I). Federal regulation authorizes states to allow termination of 
HOME Program affordability covenants upon foreclosure as well. 24 C.F.R. 
§ 92.252(e)(1)(ii). 
256. See COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, supra note 242, at 9; see also Permanent 
Affordability: Practical Solutions, supra note 243, at 11–14. 
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The availability of private, permanent financing may be particularly 
affected for perpetually restricted affordable housing because the covenant 
restricts the value of the property as collateral for the loan. To address this 
problem, jurisdictions should consider increasing public loan amounts, 
committing to capital improvement loans at some future date, making 
guarantees or other forms of credit enhancement, or releasing the 
affordability covenant under certain circumstances.257 The value limiting 
approach of perpetual affordability covenants eliminates the possibility of 
funding capital improvements by converting to market rate and increasing 
income. Federal, state, and local anti-deficiency statutes that prevent 
governmental agencies from creating financial obligations in excess of 
actual or budgeted funds available eliminates the possibility of long-term 
public funding commitments.258  
Thus, in taking the value suppression approach to perpetual 
affordability covenants, a jurisdiction must anticipate that the amount of 
initial and on-going public subsidy needed per unit will be greater than in 
jurisdictions aiming to maximize private investment in affordable housing. 
Legislators might look to rent control statutes—which limit a landlord’s 
ability to charge rents less than market rate and therefore, like affordability 
covenants, suppress the market value of the real estate as a capital asset—
for ideas in ameliorating this problem. Rental properties subject to rent 
control sometimes have similar challenges in obtaining loans for capital 
improvements.259 Some rent control statutes contain conditions and 
parameters for offering relief to landlords in need of private financing 
without releasing the rent controls altogether. For example, in the District 
of Columbia, the owner of a rent-controlled property can petition the 
District Housing Administrator for a temporary rent increase of up to 20% 
per unit, spread out over a certain number of years to pay for certain capital 
 
257. See COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, supra note 242, at 13–14; see Permanent 
Affordability: Practical Solutions, supra note 243, at 11. 
258. For example, the federal government, at least six states, and many county, city, 
and local governments have anti-deficiency statutes. See Limitations on Expending and 
Obligating Amounts, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2019), ALA. CODE § 11-43C-67 (1975), ALA. CODE 
§ 11-44C-67 (1975), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6519 (West 2005), MICH. CONST. srt. V § 
18 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2018 amendments), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1371 
(West 2007), MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-35-15 (West 1950), MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-11-15 
(West 1950), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 17-211 (West 2019), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 
1416 (West 2019), R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-16-1 (West 2019), D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-
355.01 (West 2019).  
259. Housing units subject to affordability covenants remain limited in value whether 
they are rental or homeownership units. See 24 CFR §92.254(a)(4) –(6); 24 CFR 
§92.252(e)(1); see also District of Columbia Dep’t of Hous. & Comty. Dev. Template, 
Affordable Hous. Covenant, https://bit.ly/2kL7Y4p. (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).  
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improvements or repairs.260 At the end of the specified time period, rents 
return to pre-petition levels.261 
As mentioned above, one reason a covenant can be released at 
common law is the so-called changed condition doctrine.262 At common 
law, this means that conditions surrounding the burdened or benefited 
property have changed to such a degree that the purpose of the covenant 
is defeated.263 A jurisdiction pursuing the value suppression approach to 
perpetual affordability covenants should limit the availability of the 
changed conditions doctrine while remaining cognizant of shifting state 
and federal initiatives and priorities. For example, the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) requires all 
construction, acquisition, and siting projects funded by public housing 
authorities to undergo site and neighborhood review and environmental 
justice review.264 These reviews evaluate several criteria to ensure that 
HUD-funded affordable housing projects are not further concentrating 
poverty or minority residents and that projects are not located in places 
that are less environmentally healthy than unsubsidized housing.265 Not 
only do demographics and area land uses change over time, but HUD 
requirements do as well. For example, at times, HUD has favored locating 
affordable housing in inner-city areas with the highest need for decent, 
safe, affordable housing.266 More recently, there has been a push toward 
smart growth and transit oriented design, intended to ensure that residents 
of subsidized housing have access to public transportation, jobs, retail, and 
community amenities.267 A jurisdiction adopting a value suppression 
model of perpetual affordability covenant should anticipate the possibility 
of a parcel falling out of sync with HUD location requirements and should 
have a plan for how to manage the problem.  
Another consideration for jurisdictions pursuing the value 
suppression approach is the risk that a court will recast the perpetual 
covenant as a taking without just compensation or an unconscionable loan. 
For example, the Supreme Court has found that when a permit approval is 
 
260. D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3502.10 (West 2011). 
261. Id. 
262. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 927. 
263. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 488.  
264. See Guidance on Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunity Requirements for 
PHAs, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., FAIR HOUS.AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & PUB. & 
INDIAN HOUS. 10–15 (2011), https://bit.ly/2HORHUQ. 
265. See id. 
266. See von Hoffman, supra note 187, at 7–10.  
267. From 2011 to 2015, HUD sponsored the Sustainable Communities Initiative, 
which included the Community Challenge Grant Program, which is a grant program 
designed to promote mixed-use, mixed-income (including affordable housing), transit 
oriented, higher density community planning, and development. See Community Challenge 
Grants, HUD, https://bit.ly/2HOkpFj (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) 
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conditioned on an exaction,268 there must be rough proportionality 
between the impact of the development and the exaction demanded.269 
When affordability covenants are imposed as part of a zoning or permitting 
requirement, for example, as a part of a Planned Unit Development 
approval, a jurisdiction should be cognizant of Dolan jurisprudence and 
the rough proportionality test.270 At least with regard to Inclusionary 
Zoning statutes, case law suggests courts’ disinclination to find long-term 
affordability requirements takings. In 2910 Georgia Avenue v. District of 
Columbia, where a developer challenged the District of Columbia’s 
Inclusionary Zoning statute as a regulatory taking, the federal district court 
found that the statute did not constitute a regulatory taking because only 
two of 22 units in the development were affected and the economic impact 
of the regulation did not deprive the owner of a reasonable rate of return.271 
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has held that long-term, deed-
restricted affordable housing units required pursuant to a city’s 
Inclusionary Zoning statute are not exactions to be evaluated under the 
Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions test, but rather are merely land 
use restrictions within a jurisdiction’s general police power and are 
entitled to deferential treatment.272   
c. Drafting Legislation for the Value Suppression 
Approach 
In drafting legislation to enable the creation of a portfolio of value 
suppressed real estate permanently dedicated to use as affordable housing 
via perpetual affordability covenants, a jurisdiction will want to first 
broadly define affordability covenants so that all covenants required by 
state and local programs will be covered by the statute. Second, drafters 
should include a validation statute modeled on the UCEA and expressly 
intended to validate affordability covenants despite inconsistencies with 
common law requirements.273 Third, jurisdictions should ensure due 
process but limit the means of terminating the covenant to the greatest 
extent possible by granting expansive standing to enforce as well as third 
 
268. Land-use Exaction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A requirement 
imposed by a local government that a developer dedicate real property for a public facility 
or pay a fee to mitigate the impacts of the project, as a condition of receiving a discretionary 
land-use approval.”). 
269. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
270. For discussion of Dolan, see Section III.B. 
271. 2910 Ga. Ave., L.L.C. v. District of Columbia et al., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 299 
(D.D.C. 2017).  
272. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n., 351 P.3d at 991. 
273. UNIF. CONSERVATION ACT § 3(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) (amended 2007); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 123(3) (1991). 
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party beneficiary status.274 Finally, jurisdictions pursuing the value 
suppression approach should be careful to satisfy substantive and 
procedural due process requirements of public land use law by first clearly 
articulating the public need and interest served by the legislation,275 
making decisions related to affordability covenants in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan,276 and making available to landlords methods of 
case-by-case assistance short of release. 
2. Value Capture Approach 
An alternative paradigm for understanding perpetual affordability 
covenants is to view the covenants themselves as the assets to be managed 
by the municipality. In this view, the jurisdiction does not aim to suppress 
the value of real estate, rather, it attempts to capture the difference between 
the real estate as use-restricted and at market rate and exclusively control 
when to release a covenant and for what consideration. To illustrate the 
difference between the value suppression and the value capture models, 
assume that the Chinatown low-income senior housing building from the 
hypothetical in the introduction was subject to a perpetual affordability 
covenant. The appraised value of the property, assuming its use is 
perpetually limited to providing low-income housing to seniors, based on 
the limited income-stream from rents, is valued at $65 million. The 
appraised value of the property without restricting its use to affordable 
residential housing is $265 million. In the value suppression approach, the 
municipality would essentially ignore the unrestricted value of the 
property and attempt to limit means of terminating the covenant as much 
as possible. Under the value capture approach, the jurisdiction would 
recognize $200 million as the value of the covenant and would put in place 
parameters and procedures for deciding when, whether, and for what 
consideration the jurisdiction would agree to terminate the covenant.  
a. Benefits of Value Capture Approach 
In some senses, the benefits and shortcomings of the value capture 
approach to perpetual affordability covenants are the inverse of the value 
suppression approach. For example, in the value capture model, it is 
possible for everyone—the jurisdiction, the jurisdiction’s consumers of 
affordable housing, the landlord and the prospective buyer—to benefit 
financially from the unsuppressed value of real estate restricted by a 
 
274. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f)(7) (West 2016) (granting enforcement 
authority to various public bodies; qualified past, present, and future tenants; and the 
tenants association). 
275. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.275 (West 2010). 
276. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 2009). 
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perpetual affordability covenant. The jurisdiction and affordable housing 
consumers of rental housing benefit in at least two ways. First, if a 
covenant’s term is viewed not as permanent, but rather as indeterminate, 
conditional, or subject to release in the jurisdiction’s reasonable discretion, 
there is less cause for a chill on private investment in affordable housing. 
The more leverage each subsidy dollar is able to secure in private 
financing, the more affordable housing the jurisdiction will be able to 
produce. Second, if a jurisdiction agrees to release a covenant in exchange 
for the market rate value of the covenant,277 or some value rough 
equivalent of value, the jurisdiction may be able to replace the same 
number or even more units elsewhere by reinvesting the proceeds from the 
released covenant into new affordable housing transactions subject to new 
covenants. In addition to more liquid assets, by not having permanently 
fixed affordable housing stock tied to specific pieces of real estate, a 
jurisdiction may be better able to change its affordable housing priorities 
in accordance with market factors, the comprehensive plan, or HUD 
requirements. For example, if a jurisdiction notes an increase in demand 
for housing near transit hubs, the jurisdiction may decide to release a 
covenant on valuable, downtown property in exchange for three times the 
number of affordable units being restricted in buildings near transit 
stations in less expensive neighborhoods.  
b. Drawbacks of the Value Capture Approach 
As is apparent in the hypothetical above, the obvious downsides of 
the value capture model are that it does not necessarily preserve specific 
pieces of real estate for affordable housing use. When an affordability 
covenant is terminated or released, there is a reasonable chance that the 
residents who live in the building will have to move, disrupting personal 
and community stability.278 Additionally, as with zoning amendments, 
 
277. The Massachusetts and Oregon affordability covenant enabling acts require, as 
a precondition of release, that the burdened landowner repurchase the covenant for a price 
equal to the difference between the restricted and unrestricted value of the burdened 
property. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 456.280(6) (West 2010). 
278. When affordability covenants are terminated because a property opts out of the 
project-based Section 8 program or prepays its HUD-subsidized Section 236 or 221(d)(3) 
mortgage, residents of the property are issued enhanced tenant protection vouchers. These 
vouchers are intended to enable the tenant to afford market rate rents in the building, 
depending on whether the property will continue to be a rental property and on the cost of 
the market-rate rents. See Guidance on Eligibility for Tenant Protection Vouchers 
Following Certain Housing Conversion Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (2012), 
https://bit.ly/2JQEq0d. When restrictions under the LIHTC and HOME programs 
terminate, state and local law will determine whether and how quickly rents can be raised 
to market rate and what, if any, assistance is available to low income property residents. 
Additionally, the tax code provides tenants in LIHTC properties a three-year buffer after 
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when the door is opened for a locality to release covenants or make 
individualized zoning amendments, there is great potential for corruption 
and bias. Legislation enabling the use of perpetual affordability covenants 
for the value capture approach affords the government body the discretion 
and authority to make “deals” regarding the release of covenants while 
simultaneously providing sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure 
transparency and decisions that are truly in the public interest. For 
example, Massachusetts’s affordability covenant enabling act allows only 
the governmental body or nonprofit entity who holds the benefit of the 
covenant to release the covenant. Prior to releasing a covenant, however, 
(1) the department of housing must hold a public hearing, (2) the 
department of housing must find that releasing the covenant is in 
accordance with the comprehensive plan, and (3) if the covenant was 
initially imposed in exchange for a public loan or grant, the burdened land 
owner must pay the difference between the value of the land as restricted 
and the value of the land unrestricted to purchase the property interest 
represented by the covenant.279  
c. Drafting Legislation for the Value Capture Approach  
As with the value suppression model, the most important tasks for 
affordability covenant enabling legislation in furtherance of the value 
capture model is to define affordability covenants broadly enough to 
capture all varieties of affordability covenants in use in the jurisdiction and 
validate these covenants despite their shortcomings at common law. 
Enabling legislation for affordability covenants pursuing the value capture 
model must also seek to control the circumstances of covenant termination 
as much as possible, ideally so that termination decisions are in the sole 
discretion of a governmental body. As with the value suppression model 
this means directly invalidating prescription, laches, estoppel, and 
acquiescence as means of terminating a covenant. The legislature should 
also limit beneficiary status and standing to enforce the covenant to a 
single governmental body, to the greatest extent possible. A jurisdiction’s 
decision whether to release a perpetual affordability covenant will likely 
be controversial and enabling legislation may secure the jurisdictions 
authority and discretion in making this decision. However, jurisdictions 
must be mindful of federal law in attempting to secure their own 
discretion. For example, under the federal tax code, not only the 
municipality but also all income qualifying former, current, and future 
 
the termination of the covenant, during which time rents for existing tenants cannot be 
raised by an amount more than would be allowed under the LIHTC program. Further, 
existing tenants in LIHTC properties cannot be evicted except for cause. 26 U.S.C.A. 
§42(h)(6)(E)(ii) (West 2018).  
279. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 2009). 
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occupants280 of a LIHTC project have standing to enforce the affordability 
covenant in state court.281 In Nordbye, the Oregon Court of Appeals held 
that a former tenant of a LIHTC property had standing to enforce an 
affordability covenant even though the owner of the property and the 
jurisdiction had executed and recorded a release of the covenant.282  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the billions of dollars of public affordable housing investment 
presumably secured in the United States today by affordability covenants, 
there has been shockingly little analysis of the validity of this tool. This 
Article demonstrates how perpetual affordability covenants, like 
conservation servitudes, environmental covenants, contingent zoning, and 
development agreements, are a “hybrid” public/private land use servitude 
and zoning. Most jurisdictions employing real covenants and equitable 
servitudes to secure their affordable housing investments blindly rely on 
common law principles for the enforceability of these instruments. 
However, these instruments have several glaring flaws that should prevent 
their enforceability at common law. Specifically, the benefit of the 
covenant is held in-gross, there is often no horizontal privity, and they are 
almost always unreasonable restraints on alienation. Despite these 
common law shortcomings, courts to date often enforce the covenants on 
tenuous public policy grounds. This Article strongly recommends that 
state legislators should take heed of those six states that have 
acknowledged the need for affordability covenant enabling legislation to 
secure the enforceability of these instruments and provides suggestions 
about what such enabling legislation should contain. This Article also 
serves to build on the small body of scholarly literature defining 
public/private land use devices and mapping the contours of legitimate 
state action therein. 
 
280. Granting standing to income eligible former or future occupants of a LIHTC 
project is tantamount to granting any private citizen the right to enforce the affordability 
covenant because of the relatively high income limits allowed in LIHTC projects. 
281. 26 U.S.C.A. § 42(h)(6)(B)(ii) (West 2018). 
282. Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 222 (2011).  
